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CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON, 1937-1957: PART II
WARREN L SHATTUCK*
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS AND DELEGATION OF DUTES oi CONDITIONS
Assignments. That a contract obligee can "assign," i.e., invest
another with his right, substitute a third person for himself so that
the obligor's duty to perform will run to such person, seems never to
have been seriously questioned by the Washington court. This is not
surprising. The basic legal principle which permits assignment (save
where the contract forbids or the right is "personal") is a part of our
common-law heritage?" We also inherited an unusually complicated
body of evolutionary English and American case law, produced by
the initial struggle over the basic principle of assignability and then
by the efforts of courts to create a conveyancing system appropriate
to the peculiar characteristics of the intangible contract right. Some
confusion was inevitable as different courts encountered controversies
between obligor and obligee, or one of them and the assignee, or the
assignee and creditors of or other successors of the obligee, in the
diverse settings of sale, security, gift, and assignment for collection." '
Less understandable is the appearance in modem opinions of archaic
ideas or language derived from opinions written during the formative
period of assignments.
Our court continues to use the term "equitable assignment." 2 T This
term became the accepted description for a voluntary assignment by a
private person, during the period when an assignment was apt to be
valueless unless the chancellor would protect it. A Washington assignee
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
245 The right of an assignee for collection to sue, and in his own name, was con-
firmed by Wash. Sess, Laws, 1854, p. 131, § 3, now (as amended) RCW 4.08.080, as
construed in Pioneer Mining & Ditch Co. v. Davidson, 111 Wash. 262, 190 Pac. 242
(1920). This case also acknowledges the common-law right of other types of assignee
to recover, and the inapplicability of the statute to them. Presumably the occasion for
RCW 4.08.080 was the main-party-in-interest statute, now RCW 4.08.010, and the
possibility of controversy over its application to assignments for collection, under
which the beneficial ownership will be in the assignor. An assignment for security also
results in divided interests; RCW 4.08.080 is broad enough in language to cover such
an assignment, although there is no demonstration in the decisions that security
assignees have needed to invoke the statute. RCW 4.08.080 covers only rights for "the
payment of money" and arguably will not apply to an assignment of a claim for un-
liquidated damages resulting from breach of a contract promise to render services or
transfer property. The statutory coverage is further limited, to assignments in writing.
Whether an assignee for collection would be denied recovery for failure to satisfy these
restrictions cannot be determined with assurance; the statute might be construed as
not mandatory.
248 4 CoRniN, CONTRAcTS § 856 (1950) ; 2 WLLISTON, CoxTmrcrs § 404 (rev. ed.
1936).
247 See, e.g., Arcweld Manufacturing Co. v. Burney, 12 Wn.2d 221, 121 P.2d 350(1942) ; Sundstrom v. Sundstrom, 15 Wn.2d 103, 129 P.2d 783 (1942).
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no longer needs or can get any special equitable relief and use of the
term now seems obviously anachronistic." 8 Moreover, the term sug-
gests a dichotomy, "legal assignment" and "equitable assignment,"
which does not in fact exist.
2 9
The later Washington cases have been concerned, as were the earlier
ones,250 with the requisites for and operation of an assignment. Under
neither heading has there been any notable departure from the pat-
terns previously established. It is still not possible to determine pre-
cisely what must be done in order to effect an assignment. In Crutcher
v. Scott Publishing Co., 211 "intent to transfer" was said to be the
requirement. In Arcweld Mjg. Co. v. Burney252 and Mercantile Ins.
Co. v. Jackson,2 8 "intent to transfer" and "appropriation" were said
to be necessary. In Amende v. Morto?54 "intent to transfer" and in-
tent to "deprive the assignor of control" were stressed. In Sundstrom
v. Sundstrom255 the court said: "an equitable assignment must be
supported by a valuable consideration." In several opinions a writing
evidencing the assignment was held to be unnecessary.28
It might be inferred from the opinion in Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Jack-
son 7 that intent by the assignee to receive the assignment is an addi-
tional requirement. The court's failure to mention such a requirement
in other opinions, and the evident absence of any reason why the
assignee's intent should be a factor, suggest that the inference is an
unsound one in the ordinary assignment situation. 5 "
248 In Barto v. Seattle & Int'l Ry., 28 Wash. 179, 68 Pac. 442 (1902), the court care-
fully analyzed the right of an assignee against the obligor and clearly stated his
interest to be a legal one; the terminological implications of the opinion seem to
have been overlooked by later judges.
249 4 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS §§ 858, 889 (1950) ; Cf. 2 WImsToN, CONTmAcTs §§ 446A,
447 (rev. ed. 1936).
250 For a discussion of the earlier cases, see WASHNGTON AwNOTATIONS, RESTATE-
mENT, CONTRAcTS § 148 et seq.
25142 Wn.2d 89, 253 P.2d 925 (1953).
252 12 Wn.2d 212, 121 P.2d 350 (1942).
258 40 Wn.2d 233, 242 P.2d 503 (1952).
25440 Wn2d 104, 241 P.2d 445 (1952).
255 15 Wn.2d 103, 129 P.2d 783 (1942).
2 5 Stndstrom v. Sundstrom, 15 Wn.2d 103, 129 P.2d 783 (1942) (it was also held
that a contract provision requiring a written assignment was for the obligor's benefit
only and could not be put in issue by another) ; Crutcher v. Scott Publishing Co.,
42 Wn2d 89, 253 P.2d 925 (1953). There are similar earlier decisions. See WASH-
INGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 157. See also n. 269 below.
25?40 Wn.2d 233, 242 P.2d 503 (1952). The court said: "No particular form is
necessary to constitute an equitable assignment-Any words or transactions indi-
cating an intent, on the one side, to assign, and an intent, on the other, to receive, are
sufficient, assuming there is a valuable consideration." The court went on to find an
assignment, although the opinion contains no further discussion demonstrating proof
of the assignee's intent to receive the assignment
258 See 2 WiLLisToN, CoNT-RAcTs §§ 424, 1221, 1222 (rev. ed. 1936). Cf. RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 159 (1932). An assignee can of course disclaim an assignment
made to him without his assent. RESTATEMENT, CONTCTS § 159(3) (1932).
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"Appropriation" and "intent to deprive the assignor of control" are
probably only variant expressions of the same idea. That either of
them actually requires evidence which goes beyond proof of intent
to transfer seems unlikely! 9
"Valuable consideration" as used in Sundstrom v. Sundstrom no
doubt means "value."2 ' If value is a requirement for assignment, no
gift assignment can be made. Assignment to secure a pre-existing debt
might not be possible. This would indeed be retrogression. During
an earlier era it may have been accurate to prescribe value as a requi-
site for assignment; the chancellor was not inclined to aid volunteers
and his protection was often needed by assignees. It is not accurate
now."8' American courts have in general come to recognize that con-
tract rights are property to which the fundamental tangible personalty
conveyancing principle is applicable in sale and security transactions.
Intent to transfer is now the only proper requirement." 2 Although
gratuitous assignments have proved to be more troublesome, it is
believed that most modern courts would accept the solutions proposed
by the Restatement of Contracts. In its analysis, value is not a re-
quirement for the accomplishment of an assignment. Intent to transfer
suffices. A gratuitous assignee can collect from and discharge the
obligee. But, until he has collected, or obtained a judgment against
or novation from the obligor, his interest may be revoked by the
259 Little light on the meaning of "appropriation" can be had from the opinions. In
Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 40 Wn.2d 233, 242 P.2d 503 (1952) the court said:
"In order to accomplish an effective equitable assignment, an assignor must have
intended to transfer a present interest in the debt or fund and, pursuant to such inten-
tion, must have made an absolute appropriation of the thing assigned, relinquishing
all control or power of revocation over it to the use of the assignee." In Sundstrom v.
Sundstrom, 15 Wn.2d 103, 129 P.2d 783 (1942) the court added: "What amounts to a
present appropriation constituting an equitable assignment is thus a question of inten-
tion to be gathered from a consideration of the language used, in the light of all the
attendant facts and circumstances." "Appropriation" seems at most to contemplate
circumstances the absence of which the court deems incompatible with "intent to
presently transfer." Nevertheless, so long as the court continues to state "appropria-
tion" to be a requirement for assignment the existing uncertainty will continue.
Whether the relinquishment of all power to revoke should be a demand is discussed
below at note 275.
280 Consideration, a contract-formation requisite, cannot very well be a requirement
for assignment, which is a type of conveyance. In the Sundstrom case, cited above at
note 255, the court found its demand for a "valuable consideration" to have been met,
in the assignee's having previously permitted the use of community earnings in dis-
charge of the assignor's separate debt. The opinion does not facilitate the determina-
tion of just what value the assignee must prove. Also unhelpful are flat statements
such as appear in McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636, 29 Pac. 209 (1892), and Wash-
ington State Bar Ass'n v. Merchants Rating & Adj. Co., 183 Wash. 611, 49 P.2d 26(1935), "an assignment for collection is regarded as an assignment for a valuable
consideration." If value is a requisite, it is a fact each assignee must prove.
281 4 ConiN, CNTRAcT s § 909 (1950).
28 2 WLLISTON, CoNa-Rcrs § 424 (rev. ed. 1936); 4 CoRIN, ConAcTcrs § 879
(1950).
1959]
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assignor and is terminated by the assignor's death, save where the
assignment satisfies criteria drawn from the law of chattel gifts.!"
Under the Restatement system an irrevocable gratuitous assignment
is accomplished by delivery of a deed of gift2' or of a writing em-
bodying the contract right," 5 with intent to transfer. It is to be hoped
that our court will repudiate Sundstrom v. Sundstrom." and align itself
with those jurisdictions which recognize the limited significance of
value in present-day assignment transactions.
The Sundstrom case is particularly vulnerable insofar as it denies
(inferentially) the possibility of effecting gift assignments; it is in
conflict with other Washington decisions287 which were not discussed.
The court's refusal to require written evidence of assignment accords
with the conclusions reached in other jurisdictions where statutes do
not otherwise dictate 2" The Uniform Sales Act statute of frauds
section covering "a contract to sell or a sale" of "choses in action
exceeding the value of fifty dollars" does not preclude an oral assign-
ment. 9 Filing under the Washington accounts receivable statute °2 7
2 8
s
3 RESTAIEMENT, CONTACTS §§ 149(1), 150(2), 158 (1932) ; 2 WI.uisvox, CON-
TRACTS § 438A (rev. ed. 1936) ; 4 CoRiN, CoNTAcTs § 909 et seq.
284 Where seals no longer have their common law force the accomplishment of a
deed of gift is possible only if the court will work out a new principle. Many have,
finding an effective gift assignment in delivery, with donative purpose, of an unsealed
signed writing reciting the donor's transfer purpose. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 438B
(rev. ed. 1936). Our court might also. See the discussion in Tucker v. Brown, 199
Wash. 320, 92 P.2d 221 (1939).
285 The cases are far from harmonious in their disposition of issues involving the
sufficiency of the relationship between right and document. 2 W --isToN, CONTACTS§§ 439, 440 (rev. ed. 1936); 4 CoRniN, CoNTRACTs § 915 (1950). A life insurance
policy would generally be recognized as embodying the insured's right. The Sundstrom
case, cited above at note 255, in which our court announced the necessity for "con-
sideration," was concerned with what appears to have been a gift assignment and
delivery of a life insurance policy. In other jurisdictions the assignment would have
been sustained without question or difficulty, on proof of the delivery and-intent to
transfer. See also n. 267 below.
266Bleitz v. Bryant Lumber Co., 113 Wash. 455, 194 Pac. 550 (1920), which also
held valuable consideration to be a requirement for assignment, was cited in the
Sundstrom opinion, and should also be overruled.
267 The Old Nat'l Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Kendall, 14 Wn2d 19, 126 P.2d
603 (1942) (gift of savings account sustained on proof of delivery of the passbook
with donative purpose; the court did not refer to the transaction as assignment; the
donor's interest was a contract right and what she accomplished was a gift assignment
of that right) ; In re Slocum's Estate, 83 Wash. 158, 145 Pac. 204 (1915) (a bond and
several notes were involved; assignment and delivery were said to be the requisites for
a gift of them). See also Tucker v. Brown, 199 Wash. 320, 92 P.2d 221 (1939).
2682 WMLISTON, CoNTRACTs §§ 424, 430 (rev. ed. 1936); 4 CosN, CoNTrAcTs
§879 (1950); RESTATEmENT, CONTRAcTs § 157 (1932).
29 RCW 63.04.050(1). In view of this section the court's broad statement in
Crutcher v. Scott Publishing Co., 42 Wn.2d 89, 253 P.2d 925 (1953), approving an
oral sale assignment, requires careful analysis. The Statute of Frauds may have been
satisfied through payment by the assignee. Of more moment is the obligor's inability
to defeat an oral assignment by resort to the statute; the assignor alone can attack an
assienment which fails to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 2 WmLisT oN, CoNTRACrs
8 430 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 4 CoRait, CoNTRACTs § 879 (1950).
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will protect only a written assignment, but the statute in no sense
makes a writing legally necessary for the accomplishment of assign-
ment.
Concerning the proof needed to establish an assignor's intent to
transfer, several of the court's later opinions are instructive. In Smith
v. Rowe"' a plaintiff whose sole evidence was the execution of a writing
otherwise in typical assignment form but not naming the assignee, and
his possession of the writing, was held unable to recover. In Arcweld
Mfg. Co. v. Burney,72 an instrument in form a power of attorney to
collect was held to have created agency rather than assignment;
garnishment of the obligor by a creditor of the principal was sustained.
In Olsen v. National Grocery Co.," an assignor who had assigned for
security was permitted to recover damages for wrongful garnishment
of the obligor; the court did not question the validity of such an
assignment, and recognized the multiple property interests present in
a security transaction. In Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Jackson," assign-
ment of his interest in a draft, by one payee to his co-payee, was found
in endorsement and delivery to a third person to hold for the assignee;
the court in stating the requirements for assignment said that the
assignor must relinquish "all... power of revocation."2" The wisdom
of this demand must be questioned. Retention by an assignor of a
power to revoke is not incompatible with intent to assignm2 It is
difficult to see how the usual assignment for collection can be sus-
tained77 or the gift assignment principles advocated above at note 267
can be developed if revocability is fatal to assignment.
270 RCW 63.16.020. It will be noticed that the statute covers both sale and pledge
assignments.
271 3 Wn.2d 320, 100 P.2d 401 (1940).
272 12 Wn2d 212, 121 P.2d 350 (1942).
273 15 Wn2d 164, 130 P.2d 78 (1942).
27440 Wn2d 233, 242 P.2d 503 (1952).
275 A like statement appeared in Sundstrom v. Sundstrom, 15 Wn.2d 103, 129 P.2d
783 (1942) and in A mende v. Morton, 40 Wn2d 104, 241 P.2d 445 (1952), which is
discussed below in n. 277.
276 RESTATENMNT, Coxr~crs § 150(2) (1932) provides that an assignment is not
ineffective because revocable. The obligor is adequately protected, being discharged
on performance to an assignee whose assignment is revocable, unless he knows the
assignment has been revoked. REsTATEMmNT, CONTRAcTs § 170(2) (b) (1932). See
also 2 Wn.Ls oN, CoxTmAcTs § 438A (rev. ed. 1936).
27 In Amende v. Morton, 40 Wn.2d 104, 241 P.2d 445 (1952) the court said of an
assignee for collection that he must have "some title, legal or equitable." The court
repeated its previous pronouncements about the need for intent to assign, surrender of
control, and absence of a right of revocation in the original owner of the claim, and
concluded the plaintiff could not maintain the action as an assignee. Part of his
difficulty was a provision in the alleged assignment-document authorizing the owner
of the claim to terminate the arrangement "at any time after one year from the date
hereof by ninety days written notice." This was clearly enough a reserved right of
revocation and fatal under the court's formula. The court appears however to have
1959]
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In Hartmeier v. Eiseman" 's the court followed its earlier decisions
on checks, saying: "The ordinary bank check is not, in either law or
equity, an assignment of the funds upon which it is drawn, but is
merely an order for the payment of money .... 2)279 In Philip v.
Seattle ° a promise to assign was held not to create an assignment.
Several problems about the operation of assignments reached our
court during the period under review. In School Dist. Number 15 v.
Peoples Nat'l Bank,281 the court reaffirmed its earlier view that "money
due or to become due upon a contract... is assignable" and sustained
against a subsequent federal tax lien a security assignment which in
part covered progress payments and retainage thereafter to be earned
by the assignor. In Burleson v. Blankenship 8 2 the court refused to
find that assignment of his interest by one of the partner-obligees to
his copartner violated a contract term prohibiting assignment. In
overlooked the fact that the parties here merely expressed what in many other assign-
ment-for-collection transactions will be necessarily implied, i.e., a right to revoke. If
the assignee for collection fails to proceed with diligence the assignor can no doubt
terminate the assignment by notices to assignee and obligor. Brockhausen v. Toklas,
64 Wash. 150, 116 Pac. 668 (1911). He may be able to revoke the assignment even
though in so doing he breaches a contract with the assignee. Underlying the assign-
ment for collection there will be an attorney-client or agency relation. Can the
assignee resist revocation of the assignment if this basic relationship is terminated by
the assignor, withal wrongfully? Concerning other aspects of assignments for collec-
tion, see 4 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 882 (1950).
27834 Wn.2d 225, 208 P.2d 918 (1949).
279 See WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 163(2) (1932).
Our court's position is that which American courts in general have reached. 4 Coannt,
CONTRACTS § 880 (1950).
280 195 Wash. 386, 81 P.2d 279 (1938). A secured creditor released his security
and in lieu of it received a promise by the debtor to assign a claim against Seattle,
whether under a contract then extant or one expected to be made not being deter-
minable from the opinion; the promised assignment was later made, within four months
of the assignor's bankruptcy; it was held in this action that the promise to assign was
not an assignment, and that the assignment later made was preferential. On the first
point this is the usual result. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 166 (1932); 4 CoRaIN,
CONTRACTS § 877 (1950); 2 WLLIsTON, CONTRACTS § 428 (rev. ed. 1936). On the
second point the opinion is confused in analysis and appears to conflict with the
principle which appertains in Washington and elsewhere under which a promise to
create a pledge gives the promisee, if he has parted with his credit, the position of an
equitable pledgee when the promisor acquires the subject matter. Whiting v. Ruben-
stein, 7 Wn.2d 204, 109 P.2d 312 (1941) ; WmZiSTON op. cit. § 429. Cf. the 1938 and
1950 amendments to § 60, Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96.
28113 Wn.2d 230, 124 P.2d 947 (1942). It is generally recognized that rights under
an existing contract can be assigned, although the obligor's performance is to be
rendered at a later date and is conditioned on performance by the assignor. RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 154 (1932) ; 2 Wu.LisToN, CONTRACTS § 413 (rev. ed. 1936). Care
must be exercised in distinguishing a presently extant contract right and the "fund" or
"money" which will be the obligor's performance and which will be forthcoming in the
future. Failure to do so may lead to the erroneous conclusion that the "fund" was the
subject matter of the purported assignment, which must then fail because the fund was
non-existent when its transfer was attempted.
282 193 Wash. 547, 76 P2d 614 (1938). The court said: "In determining whether
these transactions violate the stipulation against assignment, we must look to the
covenant itself, bearing in mind that covenants of such character are to be strictly-
even literally-construed."
[VOL. 34
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Sundstrom v. Sundstrom285 and Erckenbrack v. Jenkins,284 it was held
that a contract provision regulating assignments was for the benefit
of the obligor alone. In Association Collectors, Inc. v. Hardman,"'
recovery by an assignee for collection was refused, the assignor being
an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business here.28 The inability
of an assignor to assign a greater interest than he has was again
affirmed in Stansbery v. Medo-Land Dairy, Inc."" The assignee was
held to have taken subject to modifications of the basic transaction
between assignor and obligor, effected prior to notice to the obligor
of the assignment."' The assignee tried without success to invoke an
estoppel against the obligor, for its failure to disclose the modifications
known to it when the assignment was made.2"9 In re Dickson's Estate9
held that the federal government's statutory priority in an insolvent's
estate attached to a claim acquired by assignment. Hall v. Mathew-
son,29' although involving a judgment, merits mention. An assignment
document phrased "I do hereby.., assign... all of my right, title
and interest" was found to be but a quit claim by the assignor, without
283 15 Wn.2d 103, 129 P.2d 783 (1942) (life insurance policy; clause requiring
assignment to be in writing).
28433 Wn.2d 126, 204 P.2d 831 (1949) (real estate contract; clause forbidding
assignment by the vendee save "in writing attached hereto and approved by the seller").
285 2 Wn.2d 414, 98 P.2d 318 (1940).
288 This was not the expectable result, in view of previous decisions permitting
recovery by such an assignee although the assignor was a domestic corporation in-
capable of maintaining an action for failure to pay its license fees. Pacific Drug Co. v.
Hamilton, 71 Wash. 469, 128 Pac. 1069 (1913) ; Marshall v. Pike, 145 Wash. 348, 260
Pac. 531 (1927). Four judges dissented. A 1957 statute permits foreign corporations
to engage in the business of loaning against the security of mortgages on real property
in Washington, without qualifying here. They can enforce obligations taken in the
course of such business; so can their assignees. RCW 23.54.010 et seq.; Legislation
Note, Foreign Corporations, Organizations-Mortgages-Right of Action, 32 WASH.
L. Rxv. 204 (1957).
287 5 Wn.2d 328, 105 P.2d 86 (1940).
288 The obligor was also permitted to deduct from his payment to the assignee sums
disbursed by him after notice of the assignment, which were in the court's view
reasonably and necessarily expended to enable the assignor to render his perfbrmance
to the obligor. The basic contract was one for the sale of milk and the assignment was
in form a transfer of the assignor's right to payment. Although the court's result
would appear to be amply supported by interpretation of the assignment as covering
only net proceeds of the dairy operation, the court went on to approve the proposition
that the obligor can do what is reasonably necessary to enable the assignor to render
his performance to the obligor. This is an idea of dubious propriety. See 4 CoBIN,
CoDN.Acrs § 890 (1950) ; 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 433, note 6 (rev. ed. 1936).
289 Cf. National Bank of Tacoma v. Puget Sound Lumber Co., 104 Wash. 363, 176
Pac. 553 (1918) ; Doub v. Rawson, 142 Wash. 190, 252 Pac. 920 (1927). A repre-
sentation made to a prospective assignee by the obligor, that he has no defense or
cross-claim, may estop him from later asserting to the contrary. Butters v. Oles, 124
Wash. 380, 214 Pac. 629 (1923).
290 197 Wash. 145, 84 P2d 661 (1938
291 192 Wash. 651, 74 P.2d 209 (1937).
19591
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warranty either that the judgment existed or that it could be col-
lected.2 92
The legal relations between an assignee and a creditor of the as-
signor reached the court in two cases of unusual interest. Both cases
came out of the same transaction. After notice of assignment, the
obligor was garnisheed by a creditor of the assignor. He answered,
setting out the assignment, and paid the money into court. A judgment
was subsequently entered awarding the fund to the garnisheeing credi-
tor and purporting to discharge the obligor both as to the assignor and
the assignee. The assignee was not interpleaded or served and did not
intervene; in fact it did not know of the garnishment proceeding until
after the judgment was entered. The assignee thereafter sued the
obligor. Its right to do so was affirmed in Portland Ass'n of Credit
Men, Inc. v. Earey9 The obligor then successfully sued both the
garnisheeing creditor and her attorney, who had received as his fee a
part of the garnishment proceeds. 9 ' The court in these decisions
recognized the priority of an assignment as against a subsequent
garnishment or attachment 95 and spelled out the procedure to be
2 92 In the usual sale-assignment transaction the assignor impliedly warrants the
existence of the contract right but not its collectibility. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS
§ 175 (1932); 4 CoRIN, CoNTRAcTS § 904 (1950); 2 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 445
(rev. ed. 1936).
3 42 Wn.2d 273, 254 P.2d 758 (1953). The court said in Earley v. Rooney, note
294 below, that the assignee could have recovered from either obligor or garnisheeing
creditor. The obligor has no defense because the judgment was entered without the
court having obtained jurisdiction over the assignee or his interest. The creditor has
received a fund which is rightfully property of the assignee.2 9
" Earley v. Rooney, 49 Wn.2d 222, 299 P2d 209 (1956). The recovery was in
quasi-contract.
295 This is the usual holding, where the obligor was informed of the assignment in
time to enable him to defeat the garnishment. During what stage of the proceeding
the garnishment can be defeated by allegation and proof of an assignment varies in
different states, the more common view being that the cut-off point is the entry of
judgment. 4 CoRB N, CoNmAcTs § 903 (1950) ; 2 WLLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 434 (rev.
ed. 1936). The RESTATEmmNT, CONTRACTS § 172 (1932) adopts a more plausible solu-
tion, according the superior right to the assignee without regard to notification of the
obligor, who in turn is discharged as to the assignee if he is not notified in time to
enable him to defeat the garnishment. Presumably, where this occurs, the assignee
can recover from the garnisheeing creditor. This analysis would probably prevail in
Washington. Although in both the Portland Ass'n and Earley cases the fact that both
obligor and creditor were aware of the assignment was stressed, the court cited with
apparent approval Bellingham Bay Boom Co. v. Brisbois, 14 Wash. 173, 44 Pac. 153,
46 Pac. 238 (1896), in which the court said: "[A]n assignment of a chose in action
in good faith and for value... is complete and effectual as against third persons, upon
its execution and delivery to the assignee, and does not acquire any additional force or
validity by notice to the debtor." The priority of the assignee and his right to recover
from the garnisheeing creditor without regard to notice to the obligor, seems to be
assured by the accounts receivable filing statute, RCW 63.16.010 et seq., where the
assignee filed. On the other hand, an assignee whose assignment is within the opera-
tion of this statute and who does not file is subordinate to the assignor's creditors
even though he does notify the obligor.
[Voi- 34
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followed by an obligor subjected to garnishment.20
Delegation. In Hesselgrave v. Mott 2T the court stated both the
basic principle which bars delegation of a contract duty where the
obligor's performance is of a "personal" character, and the inapplica-
bility of this principle where the obligee consents to the delegation.
Presumably the court would sustain delegation if the duty affected is
not personal.9
THE STATUTE OF FiRAuDs
Suretyship. RCW 19.36.010 reads in part: "In the following cases,
specified in this section, any agreement, contract, and promise shall
be void, unless such agreement, contract or promise, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized: ... (2) Every special promise to answer for the debt,
default, or misdoings of another person." This statute generated a
limited amount of appellate litigation during the 1937-1957 period.
The inapplicability of the statute to a promise made to a debtor,
to pay his debt, was reaffirmed by the court in Miller v. O'Brien.299
Lloyd Co. v. Wyman"'0 and Stowell Lumber Corp. v. Wyman'" in-
29
8 The court pointed out that payment into court is not a part of the garnishment
procedure, that the assignee must be a party if the judgment is to adjudicate his
interest, and that interpleader is the usual procedure by a debtor who faces conflicting
claims.
297 23 Wn.2d 270, 160 P2d 521 (1945).
298 The duty in question was to provide care and maintenance of an elderly man.
The court said: "It is unquestionably true that the obligation arising out of a contract
in which one party agrees to support another is personal to the obligor and cannot be
avoided or assigned by him to a third party without the consent of the beneficiary of
the obligation." "Assignment," which is a term describing a type of conveyance, seems
obviously inappropriate in this context. A contract obligor cannot convey his duty;
he can authorize another to perform for him, and can in addition procure the third
person's promise to perform for him. These are processes best described by the term
"delegation." The obligee becomes involved only when the delegatee proffers per-
formance, or the obligor accompanies the delegation with a statement that he will not
perform. Whether a proffer of performance by the delegatee has the same legal effect
as would a proffer by the obligor depends on the principle stated in the Hesselgrave
case. Whether a statement by the obligor that he personally will not perform is a
wrongful repudiation turns on the same principle. Of course, if the obligor denies all
liability (i.e. even if the delegatee should fail to perform) he repudiates without regard
to the delegability of the duty. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS §§ 160, 165 (1932);
4 COmIN, CONTRACTS § 865 et seq. (1950) ; 2 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 411, 411A
(rev. ed. 1936).
299 17 Wn.2d 753, 137 P.2d 525 (1943). This is the usual holding. RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 191 (1932); 2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 357 (1950); 2 WILLSTON, CON-
TRACTS § 460 (rev. ed. 1936). For the earlier Washington decisions see WASHINGTON
ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 191.
300 16 Wn.2d 621, 134 P.2d 459 (1943) (defendant's promise "collateral"; statute
applied).ale19 Wn.2d 487, 143 P.2d 457 (1943) (defendant's promise "direct"; statute did
not apply).
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volved the perplexing "direct promise or collateral promise" prob-
lem,30 2 and added little to the earlier and generally unsatisfactory
cases." 3 The "main-purpose exception" came to issue in four cases,"04
one of which"' should, if carefully followed, aid materially in avoid-
ing perpetuation of the dialectic confusion created by prior decisions. 06
802 Where S requests C to deliver goods or render services to P and promises C
to pay, does the statute apply? As our court has phrased the controlling proposition,
a "direct" promise is outside the statute, while a "collateral" promise is within it. The
difficulty is in determining what facts will move the court to classify a promise one
way or the other. The question is, in the court's view as indicated in the Stowell
Lumber Corp. case, note 301 above, "primarily one of fact, to be determined by a con-
sideration of the evidence, with the view of ascertaining the person to whom it was
agreed the credit should be extended. In determining that question, regard must be had
to the situation of the respective parties, the words used by them, their understanding
of the words used, and all the circumstances connected with the particular transaction."
In its preoccupation with intent and the words used by the parties, the court has paid
insufficient attention to a detail which would appear to be the key to correct analysis,
i.e. did P undertake to pay C? Even if S's promise was to pay "if P does not" (which
is typical guaranty language) the statute cannot apply if P never undertook to pay C;
if on the other hand P did so undertake, the statute should apply without regard to
the phrasing of S's promise, save where P and S became joint debtors or were really
both principals. See 2 CoRDiN, Cozrincrs §§ 349, 352, 356, 361 (1950) ; 2 WmLs-
ToN, CoNTRAC s §§ 454, 462-464 (rev. ed. 1936).
803 Burns v. Bradford-Kennedy Lumber Co., 61 Wash. 276, 112 Pac. 359 (1910);
Goldie-Klenert Distributing Co. v. Bothwell, 67 Wash. 264, 121 Pac. 60 (1912);
Sperry Flour Co. v. Krehbeil, 133 Wash. 673, 234 Pac. 1028 (1925).
304 Collins v. Nelson, 193 Wash. 334, 75 P.2d 570 (1938); Andrews v. Standard
Lumber Co., 2 Wn.2d 294, 97 P.2d 1062 (1940) ; Lloyd Co. v. Wyman, 16 Wn2d. 621,
134 P.2d 459 (1943) (each of which appears to approve the unfortunate idea that an
oral promise to pay another's debt must be supported by a peculiar and unusual variety
of consideration; see discussion, n. 118 above); Fairview Lumber Co. v. Makos, 44
Wn.2d 131, 265 P.2d 837 (1954).
805 In the Fairview Lumber Company case, cited in the preceding note, the court.
quoted the RESTATEmENxT, CoNxTRAcrs § 184 (1932), which stresses the desire of the
promisor to obtain the promisee's performance to the principal "mainly for his own
,pecuniary or business advantage", and went on to say: "This court has consistently
followed the principle of Burns v. Bradford-Kennedy Lumber Co., 61 Wash. 276, 280,
112 Pac. 359 (1910), '. . . that where the leading object of the promisor is to subserve
some interest or purpose of his own, notwithstanding the effect is to pay or discharge
the debt of another, his promise is not within the statute."
$06 Characteristic of the earlier decisions is Washington Printing Co. v. Osner, 99
Wash. 537, 169 Pac. 988 (1918), from which the following criteria for the main-
purpose exception can be isolated: proof that the promisor promised to pay the debt as
his own, proof that he promised to further his own financial interests, proof that he
promised for a consideration "redounding to his financial benefit," and proof that his
leading object was to "subserve some interest or purpose of his own." These may be
just four ways of expressing the same requirement; so long as the court repeats them
separately it will be impossible to determine precisely what is the standard. In the
Lloyd Company case, cited in n. 304 above, the "special consideration" demand was
stated, as it had been in McKenzie v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 9 Wash. 442, 37 Pac.
668 (1894). In the Burns case, (see n. 305 above), the "leading object" criterion was
stressed; so also of Seiffert Co. v. Wright, 108 Wash. 616, 185 Pac. 577 (1919). In
Dybdahl v. Continental Lumber Co., 133 Wash. 81, 233 Pac. 10 (1925) the court
examined both the "special consideration" and "leading object" tests, and concluded
that the real test is proof of a "personal benefit moving to the promisor ... of such a
personal, direct and substantial character as to fairly justify and naturally lead the
promisor to make the debt his own.. ." See also Guth v. First Nat'l Bank, 137 Wash.
280, 242 Pac. 42 (1926) ; Jarnsen v. Curtis, 182 Wash. 499, 47 P2d 662 (1935). It is
apparent that the court is in search of a relationship between the surety and the
creditor-principal transaction such as will justify holding the surety on his oral
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In Smaby v. Shrauger307 the court refused to apply the statute to a
novation.3 0
Broker's Contracts. RCW 19.36.010 brings within the Statute of
Frauds "An agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker
to sell or purchase real estate for compensation or a commission." No
diminution in the volume of appellate litigation engendered by this
provision can be observed in the period under review.
An earlier decision holding a lessee's interest to be personalty, and
hence not within this section, was followed in Johnson v. Rutherford."'
Pavey v. Collins °10 involved a broker who received a listing which
satisfied the statute, and who subsequently received a letter which he
argued extended the listing, it having by its terms expired. He did
not prevail.81' In Leo v. Casselman1 2 and Geohegan v. Dever,"3 the
court followed earlier decisions requiring that a written listing agree-
ment contain "a description of the land sufficiently definite to locate
it without recourse to oral testimony."31" ' In the latter case, however,
the court decreed reformation of the listing document to make the
land description accurate, thus curing the Statute of Frauds defect. 15
promise. It is doubtful whether any better articulation of the essential relationship
can be found than that set out in the RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 184 (1932) ; it repre-
sents the editors' synthesis of many cases from American jurisdictions, exhibiting in
the mass the same uncertainties and imprecision which our cases exhibit. See 2 CORBIN,
CoNTRACTs § 366 et seq. (1950) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 470 (rev. ed. 1936).
807 9 Wn2d 691, 115 P.2d 967 (1941). The decision was said by the court to be one
of first impression in Washington. Four judges dissented, because in their estimation
the original debtor was not discharged by the new transaction.
808 This is the usual holding. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 183 (1932) ; 2 CoRxBI,
CONTRACTS § 365 (1950).80932 Wn.2d 194, 200 P.2d 977 (1948). A broker who negotiated the sale of a
tavern business, including the seller's leasehold, was permitted to recover on the
seller's oral promise to pay a commission. Cf. RCW 65.08.060, part of the recording
statute, which defines "real property" for the purposes of that statute as including a
leasehold for a term exceeding two years. This and other broker problems are dis-
cussed in Comment, The Real Estate Broket's Statute in Washington, 23 WASH. L.
Rxv. 116 (1948).
31031 Wn2d 864, 199 P.2d 571 (1948).
811 The court said: "[A] contract which by its terms has expired is legally defunct,
and, since the vitality which it once had has ceased, there is nothing upon which an
extension may legally operate." The letter was not of itself sufficient because it failed
to identify the property or express a promise to pay a commission.
812 29 Wn.2d 47, 185 P.2d 107 (1947) (property described as "Casselmans Service,
96 & Waller Building Good Will Legal Disc. on back"; the broker subsequently wrote
the legal description on the back of the listing document; the court found that he was
not authorized to do so and that the Statute of Frauds defect was not cured; Cf. Ed-
wards v. Meader, cited n. 345 below).815 30 Wn2d 877, 194 P2d 397 (1948) (listing document set out a legal description
but it was not the right description for the property.)
314 It may be doubted that any description of the property short of the legal de-
scription will be sufficient; see the land-contract discussion below at nn. 323, 324, 325,
330, 331.315 In permitting reformation for mutual mistake the case conforms to the latest
land-contract case. See the discussion at nn. 338, 340 below.
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In two cases the court reaffirmed its previous ruling that failure to
satisfy the statute does not preclude recovery on a promise to pay,
made after the broker's services were rendered. 19
American, Inc. v. Bishop"' and Gertz v. Shaeffer"" brought to the
court deceit actions, the gravamen of each being an oral promise to
pay a commission if the broker procured a buyer, the promise being
made without intent to perform it. In each case a judgment below
dismissing the action was affirmed. In the Gertz case the broker was
equally unsuccessful in his attempt to state, as a second cause of
action, a tortious conspiracy between the seller and buyer to deprive
him of his commission.
Is an orally-authorized broker an agent and as such subject to the
responsibilities of the principal-agent relationship? Agency is a status,
for the creation of which a contract is not necessary. This Statute of
Frauds section is relevant, where the issue is the existence of agency,
only if the statute requires written evidence of the authorization. In
Pedersen v. Jones"9 and Mele v. Cerenzie, 2 the court followed earlier
cases in concluding: "The agreement which the statute declares void
unless in writing is one for the payment of a commission to the agent,
but it does not say that the actual authority to sell or purchase must
be in writing." This construction seems obviously correct. The statute
is aimed at brokers and fabricated proof of a promise to pay a com-
mission, and purports only to invalid the oral "agreement." The con-
trary construction would provide brokers with a shield behind which
they could violate their trust with impunity. Some doubt about the
3186 Richey v. Bolton, 18 Wn.2d 522, 140 P.2d 253 (1943) ; Johnston v. Smith, 43
Wn.2d 603, 262 P.2d 530 (1953). The technical basis stated for this result is the
language of the statute, which is worded "an agreement authorizing or employing."
The consideration problem posed by a promise to pay for services previously rendered
under an agreement declared by the statute to be "void" was discussed above at nm.
209, 210. Persons unfamiliar with the many curious consequences of the Statute of
Frauds may feel the differentiation between an oral promise to pay made before the
broker renders his services and one made afterward to be strangely technical. A varia-
tion of the later-promise-to-pay reached the court in Haynes v. John Davis & Co.,
22 Wn.2d 474, 156 P.2d 659 (1945) ; the earnest money agreement which seller and
buyer signed provided that if the buyer defaulted the broker could retain enough from
the down-payment to cover its "regular commission ;" the court enforced this clause
according to its terms, refusing to find in it any violation of the statute.
8317 29 Wn.2d 95, 185 P.2d 722 (1947).
81838 Wn.2d 639, 231 P.2d 273 (1951).
819 35 Wn.2d 180, 211 P.2d 705 (1949) (an orally-employed broker was held liable
to his principal for a profit made by the broker through concealment of his interest
in the property purchased by the principal).
8 040 Wn.2d 123, 241 P.2d 669 (1952) ; noted 27 WAsH.L.REv. 230 (1952) (princi-
pal recovered from an orally-employed broker who in negotiating a sale falsely repre-
sented to the principal that the sale could be closed only by procuring a loan for the
purchaser, which would entail payment by the principal of a bonus to the lender; no
loan was procured; the broker pocketed the bonus).
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court's position was, however, created by Carkonen v. Alberts," which
preceded the Pedersen and Mele cases and was neither over-ruled nor
clarified by them. The Carkonen case involved a broker orally em-
ployed to negotiate for the purchase of land by the principal. The
broker bought for himself, using his own money. He subsequently sold
the property at a profit. In an action by the principal to impose a
constructive trust on the profit, the principal lost. The court's rationale
can only be surmised, as the opinion is virtually unintelligible. It
seems to deny the existence of any agency. Until the scope and effect
of the Carkonen decision is explained by the court it will not be pos-
sible to determine with certainty the impact of the statute on contro-
versies between broker and principal, which put agency in issue.
Land Contracts. Just what Statute of Frauds appertains to Wash-
ington land transactions is not determinable. The confusion, well
developed by 1937, was not diminished by the 1937-1957 cases.22
Various questions concerning the memorandum required to satisfy
the statute have reached the court. Particularly troublesome were
controversies over property descriptions. In Martin v. Seigel2 a
formula was stated which should make the disposition of future litiga-
tion about platted property reasonably certain; the memorandum
321 196 Wash. 575, 83 P.2d 899 (1938) ; for a critical discussion of the decision see
Comment, Real Estate Brokers' Contracts Within the Statute of Frauds, 14 WASH. L.
REv. 210 (1939).
322 The original English statute (see 2 WILLIsToN, CoxNmAcrs § 449 (rev. ed.
1936)) covered a "contract or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest
in or concerning them." There is abundant evidence that agreements for the con-
veyance of an interest in land are in this state subject to a Statute of Frauds; whether
we have acquired the English statute as a part of our common law, or have a com-
parable requirement under strained constructions of the statutes relating to leases
(RCW 59.04.010) and deeds (RCW 64.04.010 and 64.04.020) is not determinable. In
support of the latter analysis are State ex rel. Wirt v. Superior Court, 10 Wn.2d 362,
116 P.2d 752 (1941) and Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn.2d 326, 294 P2d 393 (1956),
and the earlier case, Richards v. Redelsheimer, 36 Wash. 325, 78 Pac. 934 (1904).
Opposed, and suggesting the applicability only of the English statute, are cases which
sustain an unacknowledged real estate contract; see e.g., Phillip v. Curtis, 35 Wn.2d
844, 215 P.2d 431 (1950) and the earlier cases therein cited. In Davis v. Alexander,
25 Wn2d 458, 171 P.2d 167 (1946) an oral partnership to deal in land was sustained
(a result conforming to prior Washington authority and to the usual holding else-
where; see 2 ConiN, CONTRACTS § 411 (1950) ; the court referred to REm. REv. STAT.
§ 5825 (now RCW 19.36.010)) as though it were in issue. No provision of that statute
save the one-year section can by any stretching be made to cover land contracts. Un-
helpful on this problem are the many cases in which the court talked about a statute
of frauds affecting agreements concerning land, without identifying the details or the
the source. See, for a good discussion of the whole problem, Comment, The English
Statute of Frauds in Washington, 34 WASH. L. REv. 124 (1959). The boundary dispute
cases, which seem to be pretty much sui generis, are discussed in Comment, Boundary
Disputes in Washington, 23 WASH. L. REv. 125 (1948).
' 35 Wn2d 223, 212 P.2d 107 (1949) (description: 309 E. Mercer, . . . City of
Seattle, County of King; held insufficient.) The case is noted 27 WASH. L. REv. 166(1952). See also n. 330 below.
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must contain "the description of such property by the correct lot
number(s), block number, addition, city, county, and state.'"'
Whether so rigorous a test can be justified is another matter. A statute
of frauds can easily be made to foster a good deal more fraud than it
prevents. In the view of Professor Corbin, "it is going far beyond the
express provision of the statute to require a memorandum containing
an exact and complete description or containing a description that
needs no supplementary oral testimony to identify the property. 3 25
The extreme favoritism shown the statute in the Martin case contrasts
strangely with the court's handling of suretyship problems. 6 and of
oral land contracts where the buyer has partly performed.
The Martin case demand for specification of the county and state
was considerably ameliorated by Lojberg v. Viles"28 in which the
court indicated that as to Washington land it would take judicial
notice of the county and state, where the city was named.29
For unplatted property the governing formula appears to be one
several times repeated by the court, a "contract for the conveyance of
land must contain a description of the land sufficiently definite to locate
it without recourse to oral testimony, or else must contain a reference
to another instrument which does include a sufficient description." '
324 Thompson, Swan & Lee v. Schneider, 127 Wash. 533, 221 Pac. 334 (1923) was
overruled; it sustained a description worded "An eight-room house and two lots at
5822 Forty-Sixth Street, S.E., Portland, Oregon."
225 2 CORBIN, CoNTRACTS § 505 (1952). See also 2 WuI.,sON, CONTRACTS § 578
(rev. ed. 1936) ; RF-STATEMENT, CoNTRAcmS § 207 (1932) ; Annot., Sufficiency of de-
scription or designation of land in contract or memorandum of sale, under statute of
frauds, 23 A.L.R.2d 6 (1952). Of the Martin case the annotator said: "With one ex-
ception only [citing Martin v. Siegel] no court has ever required a 'legal' or formal
description in any case." 23 A.L.R.2d 6, 10. Notice however that the court's formula
for unplatted land probably also demands the legal description. See the discussion at
nn. 330 and 331 below.3 28 See the discussion above commencing at n. 304.
327 See the discussion below at nn. 347, 348, 349.
328 39 Wn2d 493, 236 P2d 768 (1951).
89 To the argument that the Martin case precluded this result the court's answer
was somewhat less than direct. After noting that the memorandum involved in Martin
v. Siegel did not omit the county or state, the court said: "A significant difference
between the instant case and the Martin case is that, while in the latter only specific
performance was asked, the prayer is for both reformation and specific performance
in the instant case." This leaves the inference that judicial notice would not be taken
unless reformation is sought. The inference is probably unsound. Cf. Bingham v.
Sherfey, discussed at n. 334 below (judicial notice taken of the correct range designa-
tion; the action was for specific enforcement only). More probably the court made
in the the Martin case a statement more sweeping than was actually intended. Judicial
notice as a curative for technical defects of this type had been recognized in Chap-
man v. Milliken, 136 Wash. 74, 239 Pac. 4 (1925), some reference to which would
have been in order had its overruling been intended by the court in the Martin case.33
o Bingham v. Sherfey, 38 Wn.2d 886, 234 P2d 489 (1951), citing Martinson v.
Cruikshank, 3 Wn.2d 565, 101 P2d 604 (1940) ; Barth v. Barth, 19 Wn.2d 543, 143
P2d 542 (1943) ; Fosburgh v. Sando, 24 Wn2d 586, 166 P.2d 850 (1946). It will be
observed that decisions preceding Martin v. Seigel, discussed at n. 323 above, which
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Although the operation of this formula is not entirely clear, it is difficult
to see how any description short of the legal description can satisfy
the formula. Such a standard is certain and easy to apply; it also goes
well past what is needed to protect against fabricated proof of
promises to convey.8
In Geyen v. Time Oil Co.,s the memorandum-signature require-
ment of the statute was put in issue. The court was apparently willing
to regard proof that the parties "accepted and acted upon" the written
agreement, unsigned by one party, as a substitute for the missing
signature. This is not the usual approach; the case badly needs
clarification.""'
A description which included the county, state and "Tax No. 3, in
Section Thirty-one, in Township Twelve, North, of Range Forty-two,
as at present designated on the tax rolls in the office of the County
Assessor," was sustained in Bingham v. Sherfey.8" The reference to
the assessor's records was accepted, this being unpiatted land. Judicial
notice was taken of the public-land survey system, supplying the
"east" needed to complete the range designation. In Platts v. Arney 85
involve platted property and which purport to demand only the requirement stated
in the Bingham case, are no longer authoritative as to platted property; see e.g.,
Bonded Adjustment Co. v. Edmunds, 28 Wn.2d 110, 182 P.2d 17 (1947) (involving a
lease), noted 24 WAsH. L. Rav. 69 (1949).
881 See Casenote, Statute of Frauds-Requisites and Sufficiency of a Written De-
scription of Land by Street and Number, 24 WAsH. LR . 69 (1949); see also n.
325 above.
382 46 Wn2d 457, 282 P2d 287 (1955).
383 The opinion is a most unsatisfactory one. The transaction in question was a lease
assignment, signed by the lessee-assignor and by Ruby Geyen for herself and her
husband as assignees. The lessor attacked the validity of the assignment, because the
husband did not sign personally. That Ruby Geyen was authorized by her husband
to sign for him seems evident; if the case involved a Statute of Frauds memorandum
problem it could have been (but was not) decided on this fact, since the statute re-
quires only signature "by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person there-
unto by him lawfully authorized" (leaving aside the possible argument that the agent's
authority must be evidenced by a writing; in the view of courts generally the argument
is unsound; see 2 Coiwnn, CONTRACTS § 526 (1950)). The court referred to both the
lease and the assignment as "contracts" and cited RCW 19.31.010 as though it applied.
That code section (save as it might pick up an assignee's promise, not performable
within a year) contains nothing bearing on a lease or a lease assignment. Neither
RCW 59.04.010 nor 64.04.010 were mentioned. Having thus arrived at an issue which
did not actually exist, i.e., that there was an agreement, to which RCW 19.36.010
applied, the court said: "The written assignment, which was accepted and acted upon
by all parties, fully meets the statutory requirement," citing Van Geest v. Willard, 27
Wn.2d 753, 180 P.2d 78 (1947). The Van Geest case did not involve the Statute of
Frauds and held only that a party thereto can become bound by a written contract al-
though he does not sign it, his assent being expressed in his conduct. See the discussion
at n. 35 above. The Geyen case appears to hold that conduct by a non-signing party can
be a substitute for a signature required by the Statute of Frauds, and can be supported
only if the husband adopted his name (apparently written in the assignment) as his
signature. It will be observed that the court did not discuss or cite decisions holding a
signature to exist by reason of adoption. See 2 CoRMnN, CONTRACTS §§ 521, 522 (1950).
88438 Wn.2d 886, 234 P.2d 489 (1951).
83546 Wn.2d 122, 278 P.2d 657 (1955).
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several signed writings were considered and a sufficient memorandum
found, it appearing from the instruments themselves that they were
part of the same transaction. In Martinson v. Cruikshanks ' an at-
tempt to supplement an inadequate written option by documents not
therein referred to failed for the stated reason, "it would require parol
evidence to establish their connection with the option agreement.""'
The court was also invited, without success, to estop the defendant
from asserting the statute, because the plaintiff, relying "upon the
good faith and integrity of the defendant and his ability and willing-
ness to perform," had expended time and money in cruising the timber
on the land and in obtaining rights of way to it.
Two actions to reform written agreements containing property de-
scriptions inadequate to satisfy the statute were unsuccessful,"3 the
court saying: "Where a contract is void under the statute of frauds,
it is not subject to reformation, since the right to reformation pre-
supposes a valid contract." This proposition is squarely opposed to
a 1925 decision,3 9 which was not mentioned. In 1951 the 1925 case
was followed, 40 and the intervening cases were not mentioned.,""
As of the present writing, the 1951 decision appears to state the
court's position on the point. 3 It is to be hoped that the court will
adhere to this position. Until the memorandum document is made to
say what the parties intended it to say, invocation of the Statute of
3363 Wn2d 565, 101 P.2d 604 (1940).
337 Concerning reference problems, see 2 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 512 et seq. (1950),
particularly § 515; 2 WiL.IsvoN, CONTRACTS § 580 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; RESTATE-
mENT, CoNTRAc s § 208 (1932) ; the discussion at n. 380 below.
.
3 8 Martinson v. Cruikshank, 3 Wn2d 565, 101 P.2d 604 (1940); Fosburgh v.
Sando, 24 Wn.2d 586, 166 P.2d 850 (1946). The cases elsewhere are divided. 3 CoRBiN,
CozqcAs § 335 (1950); 5 WIUrnsToN, CoNTRcTs § 1555 (rev. ed. 1936). The RE-
sTAEMENT, CoNT AcTs § 509 (1932) provides for reformation only where a deed
has issued or there has been partial performance.
339 Chapman v. Milliken, 136 Wash. 74, 239 Pac. 4 (1925).840 Lofberg v. Viles, 39 Wn.2d 493, 236 P2d 768 (1951).
841 Further support for the reformation remedy is to be found in Geohegan v. Dever,
30 Wn.2d 877, 194 P.2d 397 (1948), a real estate broker case. There the court did
distinguish the Martinson and Fosburgh cases (cited n. 338 above), but in a way which
is not illuminating. Of them the court said: "In neither of the cases . . . was it
alleged that the error in description was caused by a mutual mistake.. ." Since in
each of those cases the complaint sought reformation, as to which mutual mistake or
fraud is an essential element, this passage is confusing. Moreover, if in those cases
there was in fact no allegation of mutual mistake the complaints should have been
dismissed for failure to meet the criteria for the remedy sought, and the stated basis
for decisions adverse to the plaintiffs, e.g., the unavailability of reformation to correct
a mistaken description, was totally unnecessary. See also the following note.
R42 Lofberg v. Viles (cited at n. 340 above) was followed in Platts v Arney, 46
W.2d 122, 278 P.2d 657 (1955), which is also interesting in that the action was for
damages. The court apparently deemed the pleadings amended to conform to the
proof, and the instrument reformed, saying "It is apparent from the instrument itself
that the mistake is one of the scrivener. .. "
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Frauds is premature. The high degree of proof required of one who
seeks the remedy of reformation is protection enough against the
hazards of the oral evidence offered in support of the remedy."' Re-
fusal to reform a contract is manifestly inconsistent with the cases in
which deeds have been reformed. ' "
In Edwards v. Meader34 a memorandum was held to be sufficient,
although the property description was inserted by an agent after the
memorandum was signed.
That an agreement for the purchase and sale of an interest in land
can be specifically enforced despite noncompliance with the Statute
of Frauds seems never to have been questioned by our court. By 1937
the criteria which the court would exact were reasonably clear-pos-
session and improvements or payment, consented-to substantial im-
provements, rendition of the promised services (where the agreement
called for support of the promisor as the price for the promised con-
veyance.)... In specifically enforcing an oral promise to devise land
our court went very far,"4 and opened a veritable Pandora's box,
judging from the high incidence of such cases during the 1937-1957
period. 48 In these, as in most of the part performance appellate litiga-
343 See 2 CoRniN, CONTRACTS § 345 (1950) for a discussion supporting this analysis.
844As in Bacon v. Gardner, 38 Wn.2d 299, 229 P.2d 523 (1951). Compare also the
boundary cases. See Comment, Boundary Disputes in Washington, 23 WASH. L. REv.
125 (1948).
345 34 Wn.2d 921, 210 P.2d 1019 (1949). Leo v. Casselman, discussed in note 312
supra, was distinguished.
340 See WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 197, 358, 361;
Casenote, Statute of Frauds-Partial Performance, 24 WASH. L. REv. 167 (1949).
Elsewhere the cases are not entirely harmonious; some courts have given more weight
to possession alone. See 2 ConiN, CONTRACTS § 420 et seq. (1950); 2 WILLISToN,
CONTRACTS § 494 (rev. ed. 1936). Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 197 (1932).347 Velikanje v. Dickman, 98 Wash. 584, 168 Pac. 465 (1917). The court said:
"Even possession of the property is not a requisite where the consideration was per-
sonal care and services not measurable in money." See also Avenetti v. Brown, 158
Wash. 517, 291 Pac. 469 (1930). It will be observed that the court in these cases
exacted by way of description no more than identification of the property. The earlier
cases are discussed in Comment, Contracts to Devise Real Property, 14 WASH. L. RE.
30 (1939). Cf. 2 WLLsTON, CONTRACTS § 494, p. 1433, note 6 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 2 CR-
Rfl, CONTRACTS § 435 et seq. (1950).
s48 In the following cases the Statute of Frauds issue was not reached because the
claimant failed to establish the agreement: Osterhout v. Peterson, 198 Wash. 166,
87 P.2d 987 (1939) ; Aho v. Ahola, 4 Wn.2d 598, 104 P.2d 487 (1940) ; Thompson v.
Weimer, 1 Wn.2d 145, 95 P.2d 772 (1939) ; Dau v. Pence, 16 Wn.2d 368, 133 P.2d523 (1943) ; Widman v. Maurer, 19 Wn.2d 28, 141 P.2d 135 (1943) ; Payn v. Hoge
21 Wn.2d 32, 149 P.2d 939 (1944) ; Whiting v. Armstrong, 23 Wn.2d. 290, 160 P.2d
1014 (1945); Blodgett v. Lowe, 24 Wn.2d 931, 167 P.2d 997 (1946); Jennings v.
D'Hooghe, 25 Wn.2d 702, 172 P.2d 189 (1946) (fully discusses the prior cases) ; In re
Hickman's Estate, 41 Wn.2d 519, 250 P.2d 524 (1952); Boettcher v. Busse, 45 Wn.2d
579, 277 P.2d 368 (1954). In Ellis v. Wadlegh, 27 Wn.2d 941, 182 P.2d 49 (1947)
and Southwick v. Southwick, 34 Wn2d 464, 208 P.2d 1187 (1949) specific enforce-
ment was decreed; in each instance the statute was met by the promisee's rendition of
the services contemplated by the agreement. The promisee also prevailed in Luther v.
National Bank of Commerce, 2 Wn.2d 470, 98 P2d 667 (1940); she both served and
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tion during this period,"" the issues were factual. Few of the cases
justify discussion here.
Resor v. Sctaefer"0 and Rickhardson v. Taylor Land & Livestock
Co. 3 51 are notable, because the opinions in these cases contain full and
helpful discussions of basic problems. In the Resor case Judge Steinert
pinpointed a crucial detail-the existence of the alleged agreement
must be established by proof of more than ordinary persuasiveness."5
sold a business at the promisor's request in order to be free to serve. Forsberg v.
Everett Trust & Savings Bank, 31 Wn.2d 932, 200 P.2d 499 (1948), noted 24 WASH.
L. Rzv. 167 (1949), involved an agreement between plaintiff and the decedent, whereby
each was to pay half of the cost of acquiring and furnishing the property, after which
they would share its occupancy and running expenses, and each would devise her
interest to the other; plaintiff fully performed; this the court held to be "sufficient to
take the case out of the statute of frauds." Contracts to make mutual wills were specifi-
cally enforced in Cummings v. Sherman, 16 Wn.2d 88, 132 P2d 998 (1943) and In re
Fischer's Estate, 196 Wash. 41, 81 P2d 836 (1938) ; enforcement was denied in Allen
v. Dillard, 15 Wn.2d 35, 129 P.2d 813 (1942), because the agreement was not proved.
Although the court said in the Fischer case: "to escape the nullifying effect of the
statute a sufficient part performance or full performance of the contract must be
shown," the term "full performance" probably cannot be taken literally. In the Allen
case the court said, as dictum: "the making of mutual wills is not sufficient part per-
formance to take the agreement without the statute of frauds, in the absence of any
other consideration." 15 Wn2d 35, 50, 129 P.2d 813 (1942). Since each of the
promises is to make the will, in a sense the making of a will by one party is full
performance. Similarly, if for the oral promise to make a will the consideration is a
cash payment which is made, specific enforcement is unlikely. In both the Fischer and
Cummings cases the promisee of the promise sought to be enforced had made the will
he had promised, had died, and the promisor had taken under his will. Success for
the plaintiff who cannot make a similar showing is certainly speculative. If both
parties have performed, the defect in their agreement seldom comes to litigation. An
exception is Exeter Co. v. Martin, Ltd., 5 Wn2d 244, 105 P2d 83 (1940) (oral agree-
ment for surrender of lease; held executed when the lessee relinquished and the lessor
resumed possession.)
S49 In McLean v. Archer, 32 Wn2d 234, 201 P2d 184 (1948) and Golden v. Mount,
32 Wn.2d 653, 203 P2d 667 (1949), specific enforcement of an oral promise was
refused for lack of the required high degree of proof that the agreement was made. In
Garbrick v. Franz, 13 Wn.2d 427, 125 P.2d 295 (1942), noted 18 WASH. L. Ray. 216
(1943), a lease which failed to satisfy RCW 59.04.010 ("Tenancies from year to year
are hereby abolished, except when the same are created by express written contract.")
in that the description was inadequate and the lessor's signature was not acknowledged
was treated as an agreement to lease and specifically enforced because of the lessee's
part performance (possession and substantial improvements). In Mobley v. Harkins,
14 Wn.2d 276, 128 P.2d 289 (1942) an oral promise to assign a lease was specifically
enforced; the promisee was put in possession, repaired and repainted the premises, and
was induced by the promise to purchase equipment then on the premises. In Stephens
v. Nelson, 37 Wn.2d 28, 221 P2d 520 (1950) a written agreement for the purchase and
sale of platted land, defective in that the county and state were not named, was specifi-
cally enforced because of the buyer's part performance; he had taken possession and
cleared the brush from the property; in a case decided the following year it was held
that this type of defect would be cured by judicial notice; see the discussion at nn. 328
and 329 above.
350 193 Wash. 91, 74 P.2d 917 (1937).
55125 Wn.2d 518, 171 P.2d 703 (1946).
s52 The case involved a promise to devise land; of actions to enforce such promises
the court said: "[A]lleged oral contracts to devise property have become so frequent in
recent years as to occasion alarm and cause courts to become very conservative, and
even strict, with reference to the nature of evidence required to establish [them]." An
oral promise to sell land presents a likd problem; an equally high standard of proof
should be and probably will be exacted by the court. See McLean v. Archer and
Golden v. Mount, n. 349 above. See also 2 CoRsnm, CoNTACTS § 442 (1950).
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In the Richardson case Judge Steinert discussed the additional proof
(i.e. "part performance") requisite for specific enforcement of an
agreement the court is satisfied was actually made," 3 and stated the
theoretic base on which rests the whole idea of part performance as a
counter to the Statute of Frauds: "it would be a fraud upon the pur-
chaser if the vendor were allowed to escape performance of his con-
tract after the purchaser, relying upon the agreement, has done acts
which have so altered the relations of the parties as to prevent their
restoration to their former position." ' In Granquist v. McKean.. the
court purportedly added another basic requirement, saying: "the acts
relied upon as constituting part performance must unmistakably point
to the existence of the claimed agreement. If they point to some other
relationship, such as that of landlord and tenant, or may be accounted
for on some other hypothesis, they are not sufficient." That this
passage actually states a part performance element must be questioned.
Few indeed of the Washington plaintiffs who have succeeded in ob-
taining specific enforcement of an oral promise to transfer an interest
in land proffered proof of acts unexplainable on any hypothesis save
the existence of such a promise.
Two equitable mortgage cases merit attention. One of the traditional
subjects of equity jurisdiction is a contract promise to give a mortgage.
Such a promise will be specifically enforced or an equitable mortgage
decreed to exist, at the instance of a promisee who has himself per-
formed. " " A promise to execute a mortgage on land is of course within
853 The court stated as the principal elements entry of the promisee into possession,
payment and the maing of improvements, said payment alone had been held to be
insufficient (as to which compare the services cases discussed at n. 347 et seq. above),
and of improvements said: "It is a settled proposition that not all improvements or
repairs, of however little value, will entitle a vendee to specific performance... the
improvements must be permanent, substantial, and valuable." These last three adjec-
tives may be more flexible than appears at first encounter; cf. Stephens v. Nelson and
Mobley v. Harkins, discussed in n. 349 above.
35, In Granquist v. McKean, 29 Wn2d 440, 457, 187 P.2d 623 (1947), the word
"fraud," used in the Richardson case, was amplified to "gross fraud." Just what the
court meant to accomplish by adding the word "gross" is undeterminable.
355 Cited n. 354 above. Professor Corbin suggests that judicial statements about
the need for acts of part performance which point to the alleged promise are really
another aspect of courts' insistence on clear proof of the promise. 2 CORniN, CoNTRAcTs
§ 430 (1950).
256 5 Coasur, CONTRACTS § 1153 (1950) ; 5 WLLiSTON, CONTRACTS § 1421, p. 3969
(rev. ed. 1936) ; OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 26; Klitten v. Stewart, 125 Wash. 186, 215
Pac. 513 (1923) (from the opinion it might be inferred that insolvency of the promisor
is a necessary fact; this interpretation was assumed in Stewart v. Bounds, 167 Wash.
554, 9 P2d 1112 (1932).; the point was not actually in issue in the Klitten case; insol-
vency of the promisor is not generally deemed necessary to the relief) ; Terhune v.
Weise, 132 Wash. 208, 216, 231 Pac. 954 (1925), "Since the parties intended to make
specific security for the advances, even though the assignment or the transfer of the
security was not made at the actual moment the money was lent to the company, yet
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the Statute of Frauds,"" since a mortgage is a conveyance of an in-
terest in land even though but a lien is transferred."' The statute
does not, however, in the view of most American courts, preclude the
usual relief for the promisee. The cases are not harmonious in their
disposition of the statute, some deeming it met by part performance,
others denying the applicability of the statute where the promisee has
fully performed. The latter appears to be the preferred analysis. 59 It
was adopted by our court in Fleishbein v. Thorne;"0 the court said:
"A parol agreement which has been fully performed... creates an
equitable mortgage.... [T]he contract has the effect of an equitable
mortgage and is not within the operation of the statute of frauds."
Thompson v. Hunstad8 ' must be noted here because it is in flat oppo-
sition to Fleishbein v. Thorne, although decided in 1958 and so outside
the twenty year span encompassed by this article. The court held the
statute to be applicable despite full performance by the promisee and
found full performance by the promisee to be insufficient part per-
formance to meet the statute. The Fleishbein case was not cited to,
nor by, the court. The opinion contains no discussion of equitable
mortgage principles or authorities. In its result the Thompson case
is not supportable.""
equity will impress the property with the obligation created by the contract and compel
the observance of the contract's terms." Whiting v. Rubinstein, 7 Wn.2d 204, 219,
109 P.2d 312 (1941), quoting with approval a passage from the Terhune opinion,
"Where a party by express agreement sufficiently indicates an intention to make
specific property a security for a debt or other obligation and promises to transfer such
property as security, equity impresses the property with an equitable lien in case
security is not given."
357 2 CORBrN, CoNTRAcs § 403 (1950).
358 RCW 64.04.010 (the statute of deeds) ; notice also the definition of real property
contained in the recording statute, RCW 65.08.060. See also n. 322 above.
3 59 OsBoRNE, MORTGAGES §§ 52, 56; POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 448; TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 1563 (3d ed.) ; WALSfH, MORTGAGES § 8.
360 193 Wash. 65, 73, 74 P2d 880 (1937).
381 153 Wash. Dec. 73, 330 P.2d 1007 (1958).
3 es agreement called for a loan to enable the borrower to purchase land, and
for the execution of a mortgage by him to secure the loan; the loan was made and the
property purchased; the borrower refused to execute the promised mortgage. To a
complaint setting out these facts the defendant demurred. The demurrer was sustained
in the trial court. The supreme court reversed but only because the complaint was
found to state a cause of action for restitution. The plaintiff's theory as stated in his
appellate brief was that a good cause of action for a resulting trust had been pleaded;
he also said: "there is sufficient partial performance of the entire contract to warrant
specific performance." The court denied the existence both of a resulting trust and of
a vendor's lien. On the former point this is the usual view. Annot., Rights and reme-
dies of one who advances money to purchase real estate under an oral agreement by the
vendee to give a mortgage thereon as security, 18 A.L.R. 1098, 1099 (1922). On the
latter point the result conforms to prior Washington decisions on vendor's liens. But
on the specific performance issue the opinion is confusing and at variance with the
prior Washington cases (see n. 356 above). Concerning the statute the court said:
"The plaintiff concedes that the statute of frauds (RCW 64.04.010) applies to the
alleged agreement. . . ." The cited statute is the statute of deeds, which properly
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Also of interest is Goodwin v. Gillingkam, 8 in which the court was
obliged to restate another basic proposition; part performance as a
counter to the Statute of Frauds is an equitable concept, applicable
only where equitable relief is sought.
Agreements not to be performed within a year. RCW 19.36.010
(1) extends the Statute of Frauds coverage to "every agreement that
by its terms is not to be performed in one year from the making
thereof." Several of the 1937-1957 cases involving this subsection
required only routine construction of the statute.'" Gronvold v.
Whaey" I is, however, worthy of mention; the court after full dis-
operates only on conveyances and contracts which create an interest in land; it can be
made to cover a promise to convey only by the construction discussed at n. 322 above.
(It should be noted that even where a mortgage document fails to meet the demands
of a statute of deeds, the document sufficiently establishes an equitable mortgage where
the mortgagee has extended his credit; see OssoanE, MORTGAGES § 32.) When the
court came to discuss part performance it cited only Granquist v. McKean (cited at
n. 354 above), for the proposition that the advance of funds was not part performance
because it did not point to the alleged agreement, and Richardson v. Taylor Land &
Livestock Co. (cited at n. 351 above), for the proposition that courts of equity will
ignore the Statute of Frauds only to prevent gross fraud. Neither of these nebulous
generalizations gets to the real problem. There is much direct authority on promises
to execute a mortgage. The preferred analysis of such promises stresses the promisor's
fraud and the insufficiency of legal remedies; a money judgment for restitution is not
a fair substitute for the promised security. There are cases in other jurisdictions
holding that an equitable mortgage will not be decreed where the promise was verbal
and the promisee was to and did loan money for purposes other than acquisition of or
improvement of the property; those cases do not represent the prevailing or the better
view. Where as in the Thompson case the money was loaned to enable the borrower
to acquire the property the generally expectable result is relief for the promisee in the
form of an equitable mortgage. See the Annotation cited above, and Annot., Statute
of Frauds: Doctrine of part performance as applied to advance of money on oral
agreement for mortgage on real estate, 30 A.L.R. 1403 (1924) ; see also the texts cited
above at n. 359.
868 10 Wn2d 656, 117 P2d 959 (1941). Cf. the discussion, nn. 367-374 below.
84, Cone v. Ariss, 13 Wn.2d 650, 126 P.2d 591 (1942) (oral conditional sale con-
tract, vendee to pay $657 in $25 monthly installments; statute held applicable; this is
the expectable result; see 2 CoRBiN, CoNTRAcTs § 444, p. 539, n. 9 (1950) ; 2 Wn~rs-
TON, CoNT RAcTs § 501 (rev. ed. 1936)) ; Building Union v. Seattle Hosp. Council, 18
Wn.2d 186, 138 P.2d 891 (1943) (oral five year closed-shop union-employer agree-
ment held within the statute even though the parties had also agreed to execute a
written contract document; on the ineffectiveness of an agreement to execute a writing,
to remove the transaction from the statute, this is the usual holding; see 2 WmLmsvoN,
CONTcCTs § 495, p. 1448, n. 13 (rev. ed. 1936)). Hansen v. Columbia Breweries, Inc.,
12 Wn2d 554, 122 P2d 489 (1942) (oral agreement made on July 12, 1940 to work
for a year, commencing July 1, 1940, is not within the statute) ; Dowgialla v. Knevage,
48 Wn.2d 326, 294 P.2d 393 (1956) (where the agreement does not specify when
performance is to be rendered the date for performance will be determined by ascer-
taining the intent of the parties, on examination of their objective and the surrounding
circumstances).
6539 Wn.2d 710, 237 P2d 1026 (1951). See also von Herberg v. von Herberg,
6 Wn.2d 100, 106 P2d 737 (1940) (promise to pay in two years or upon the sale of
indicated property is outside the statute) ; Sargent v. Drew-English, Inc., 12 Wn.2d
320, 121 P2d 373 (1942) (agreement for an indefinite term, terminable at will, is
performable within a year) ; Davis v. Alexander, 25 Wn.2d 458, 171 P.2d 167 (1946)
(followed the Drew case on a similar problem); Gasch v. Compton, 36 Wn.2d 782,
220 P.2d 331 (1950) (agreement for life support is performable within a year). The
von Herberg, Drew, Davis and Gasch cases conform to the usual construction of the
statute; see 2 CoRniN, CONA~cs § 446 (1950).
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cussion reaffirmed its refusal to apply the statute where the agreement
could have been performed within a year, however unlikely it was,
when the agreement was made, that performance would occur within
a year." " Also notable are Foelkner v. Perkins.. and Sunset Oil Co.
v. Vernter,8 s which indicate that an agreement not to be performed
within a year is removed from the statute by part performance. This
is a position at variance both with prior Washington decisions8 9 in
which agreements calling for the transfer of an interest in land were
not in issue, and with the majority view in other American jurisdic-
tions. 70 Neither opinion discusses the contrary cases or otherwise
demonstrates awareness by the court that it was upsetting a proposi-
tion generally deemed settled. Until further light on the problem is
provided by the court, it would not be wise to assume that the Foelkner
and Sunset Oil Co. cases will be followed. On the other hand, there is
much merit in Professor Corbin's argument that the one-year section
should yield to part performance where equitable relief is sought and
criteria comparable to those developed in the land contract cases are
satisfied." Tested by the standard he proposes, the Foelkner case
(but not Sunset Oil Co. v. Vertner, supra) was rightly decided 72 and
386 This is the usual construction. See RESTATELEENT, CoNTRAcTs § 198, comment b
(1932) ; 2 CoRsiN, CoNTRAcTs § 444 (1950) ; 2 WmLLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 495 (rev. ed.
1936).
- 197 Wash. 462, 85 P.2d 1095 (1938).
38s 34 Wn2d 268, 208 P.2d 906 (1949).
"09 Union Savings & Trust Co. v. Krumm, 88 Wash. 20, 152 Pac. 681 (1915);
Hendry v. Bird, 135 Wash. 174, 237 Pac. 317, 240 Pac. 565 (1925). See also Hamilton
v. Atlas Freight, Inc., 184 Wash. 199, 50 P.2d 522 (1935) ; Cone v. Ariss, 13 Wn2d
650, 126 P.2d 591 (1942) ; Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn.2d 326, 294 P.2d 393 (1956).
The Dowgialla case involved a plaintiff who had performed; this fact was not dis-
cussed. The Cone case involved a plaintiff who had partly performed; although the
part-performance doctrine was not discussed by the court, the Hendry case was cited
as factually similar and controlling; the Foekner case (n. 367 above) was not cited.
The cases before 1934 are discussed in Connment, Statute of Frauds--Contracts Not toBe Performed Within a Year, 9 WAsH. L. Rmv. 105 (1934).87
o See 2 CanIN, C~oNTAcTs § 459 (1950).
371z 2 CoanBIN, CoNTRCTS § 459 (1950), particularly p. 583.
872 In Foekner v. Perkins (n. 367 above), the seller under a land-purchase contract
sought to cancel the contract for alleged defaults and the buyer successfully resisted
the action by establishing part performance of an oral extension agreement; the de-
fense was in essence specific enforcement of the oral agreement Although the point
was not stressed by the court, it is of some interest that Oregon & Washington Ry. v.
Elliott Bay Mill & Lumber Co., 70 Wash. 148, 126 Pac. 406 (1912), the case princi-
pally relied on, was one involving the land-contract Statute of Frauds. The court has
not demonstrated, in specifically enforcing an oral promise to transfer an interest in
land, any reluctance to grant the relief because the promise was not performable
within a year; see e.g., Garbrick v. Franz, n. 349 above. The Sunset Oil Company
case involved a contract to buy and sell oil, assignment of his interest by the seller,
default by the buyer, and suit by the assignee. The buyer defended on the ground,
among others, that there was no mutuality because the assignee had not assumed the
obligations of the seller, his assumption promise being oral and not enforceable by the
buyer. This defense the court met by pointing to performance by the assignee to the
buyer, after the assignment and until default by the buyer; Foelkner v. Perkins and
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Hendry v. Birds73 our leading contrary decision, cannot be sustained.374
Sales. RCW 63.04.050(1) reads:
A contract to sell or a sale of goods or choses in action exceeding the
value of fifty dollars shall not be enforceable unless the buyer shall
accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold or
sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to
bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memoran-
dum in writing of the contract or sale is signed by the party to be
charged or his agent in that behalf.3 75
Of the several casese8 in which the court had occasion to consider
Rowland v. Cook, 179 Wash. 624, 38 P.2d 224 (1934) (involving a lease) were cited.
Equitable relief was not involved and for that reason the part-performance doctrine
was not properly applicable. Whether a promise to assume and pay the promisee's
obligation to another person is void under the one-year section has in the few cases
which have considered the question been answered in the negative; OsBoRXIu, MORT-
GAGES § 255. Since the contract is between promisor and promisee and the latter has
in the usual case fully performed, this seems to be the right answer. See the discussion,
n. 374 below. On this basis, the court in the Sunset Oil Company case reached a sound
result, withal on an unsatisfactory rationale. The result is certainly supported by cases
like Frazey v. Casey, 96 Wash. 422, 165 Pac. 104 (1917), in which the court enforced
an oral assumption promise.
387 Cited n. 369 above.
274 The Hendry case involved an action for specific enforcement of a promise to
transfer corporate stock; the plaintiff had both fully paid and had also remained in
the defendant's employ in reliance on the promise. In refusing relief the courtes main
reliance was on Union Savings & Trust Co. v. Krumm (cited note 369 above), in
which equitable relief was not sought. Apart from the part-performance point under
discussion here, it will be noted that the plaintiff had actually performed in full; full
performance by one party is generally held to remove the transaction from the one-year
section quite without regard to the nature of the relief sought and the limitations
attached to the part-performance doctrine. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 198, com-
ment a (1932), 2 CoamN, CoTraAcTs §§ 457, 458 (1950); 2 WhIsTOrz, CoNTRACTS§ 504 (rev. ed. 1936).
375 This part of the Urm~o~a SALEs AcT is followed by subsections (2) (excluding
contracts for the manufacture of goods especially for the buyer) and (3) ("There is
an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section when the buyer, either before
or after delivery of the goods, expresses by words or conduct his assent to becoming
the owner of those specific goods"). As to some choses, another statute is also im-
portant. The assignment of accounts receivable filing statute, RCW 63.16.010 et seq.,
restricts to a written assignment signed by the assignor the protection accorded by
the filing of a statutory notice.376 Bay Construction, Inc. v. Olsen, 23 Wn.2d 307, 161 P.2d 177 (1945) (oral agree-
ment by which plaintiff was to fill and rough-grade part of a construction site; de-
fendants Statute of Frauds defense was rejected, on finding that the plaintiff had
delivered several loads of dirt to the site before defendant directed him to cease
performance) ; Gronvold v. Whaley, 39 Wn2d 710, 237 P2d 1026 (1951) (joint
venture agreement under which plaintiff was to receive a 25 per cent interest to be
represented by stock to be held by defendant until his cash investment was recouped
from earnings; held, not a contract of sale); Pettaway v. Commercial Automotive
Serv., Inc., 49 Wn.2d 650, 306 P.2d 219 (1957) (part payment by buyer, of agreement
for the purchase of a new car, found in buyer's delivery of his used car to the seller) ;
Roberts v. Williams, 6 Wn.2d 599, 108 P.2d 334 (1940) (buyer made an offer, accom-
panied by her check for part of the price; this offer was refused but the check was
not returned; buyer then made a second offer, which was accepted; the check was
held to be part payment, on a finding that the parties so intended; no particular
attention was given to the fact a check rather than cash was involved, a point which
was at issue in a later Washington case discussed at nn. 377, 379 below).
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this statute, only Maryatt v. Hubbard"" and Grant v. Auvi5 78 require
mention. The Maryatt case put in issue, for the first time in Wash-
ington, the sufficiency of a check as "part payment." After acknowl-
edging that a check can be payment for the purposes of the statute,
the court stated the governing criteria to be intent by the buyer to pay
and intent by the seller to receive and accept the check as payment." 9
The key issue under this formula is a fact one; payment was found,
in the Maryatt case. Grant v. Auvil involved a written but unsigned
order for goods, followed by a signed message reading in part "[W] ill
you please cancel my order?" The court discussed the requirements
for a "memorandum in writing"8 ' and concluded that the statute was
not satisfied because the signed message did not sufficiently identify
the unsigned writing. The court went on, however, to say: "If the
signed memorandum makes no reference to the unsigned memoran-
dum, they may not be read together. Parol evidence is inadmissible to
connect them." This passage appears to demand an express reference
in the signed writing, to the unsigned writing, a view which may be
over-technical"' and which is in conflict with the position taken in
an earlier Washington case.'
377 33 Wn2d 325, 205 P2d 623 (1949).
37839 Wn.2d 722, 238 P.2d 393 (1951), noted 27 WAsH. L. REv. 231 (1952).
379 This is the position generally taken by other courts. 2 ConimN, CoNTRAcTs § 495,
p. 668, note 46 (1950). The contrary result has been reached where the check was
given and received as conditional payment only; Professor Corbin suggests that the
distinction between payment and conditional payment is not a valid one. 2 CoRBx
op. cit. § 495, p. 669. A few courts have purported to require proof of an express
agreement to receive the check as payment. Annot., Check as payment within con-
templation of Statute of Frauds, 8 A.L.R. 2d 251 (1949). The RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRAcTs § 205 (1932) appears to make delivery and receipt of a check proof enough of
"payment," leaving no open issue about the parties' intent.
o The court recognized that a signed writing purporting to deny or cancel the
earlier transaction can be a memorandum (the usual result; 2 CoRnIN, CoNTRAcTs
§ 511 (1950)) and that signed and unsigned writings can be considered together where
the internal reference is adequate; identification of the transaction in the signed writing
is not enough; what must be identified is the other writing.
3812 Wn.LIsToN, CoNTcrs § 582 (rev. ed. 1936); 2 CoRBIN, CONTRcTs § 512
(1950). See also RESTATEmENT, CONTiACTS § 208(b) (iii) (1932).
882 Jones-Scott Co. v. Ellensburg Milling Co., 108 Wash. 73, 183 Pac. 113 (1919).
The action was by seller against buyer. The unsigned writing was a letter from the
seller to the buyer; the signed writing was the buyer's reply, reading: "If you will
give me time I will take the wheat bought from you in August." The court said: "We
think there can be no doubt that this letter refers to the contract mentioned by the
[seller's letter]." The case seems to fall within the group of which Professor Corbin
said, with approval, 'Trhe ncessity of any internal reference at all, much more the
necessity of a completely identifying internal reference, is dependent on the surrounding
facts. If in the light of this accompanying evidence, the court is convinced that no
fraud is being perpetrated and that the several writings, taken together, evidence with
reasonable certitude the terms of the contract, internal references can be dispensed
with." 2 CoaniN, CONTRACTS § 512, p. 746, 747 (1950). In Grant v. Auvil, the Jones-
Scott Company case was distinguished, the court saying of it, that the signed writing
"contained an internal identifying reference. . . ." The differentiation is not persua-
sive. Where in the buyer's letter is there an "identifying reference?" The Jones-Scott
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Parol Discharge Agreement. An oral accord followed by satis-
faction, in Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Faulkner,88 was held to dis-
charge a written guaranty contract.
The Scope and Meaning of Contracts. The number of 1937-1957
cases cited or discussed in this section is proof enough of the frequency
with which interpretation and parol evidence rule controversies occur.
It is proof too that precise exposition is not easy in the English language
and that the parol evidence rule is not one of the clearer doctrines.
Carelessness, preconceptions, or thinking so fuzzy that no clear pur-
pose is ever really achieved much less expressed can compound the
risk of ultimate disagreement. After reading a few hundred of these
cases a prospective draftsman, no matter how experienced, would
probably approach his job with increased humility and caution.
Interpretation. The later cases demonstrate no marked departures
from the patterns previously set. They do emphasize a cleavage con-
cerning the interpretation of a contract evidenced by a writing, which
will be discussed at some length below.
Interpretation controversies may involve a single word, or words
in combination, or conduct. Our concern here is with words, and with
conduct insofar as it may affect the meaning of words. 8'"
Interpretation is the process by which the meaning of an expression
of purpose is determined. If the parties, when they made their
case appears to be irreconcilible with the quoted passage from the Grant case, requiring
an internal reference. It will be observed that the result of the Grant case did not
require resort to a requirement of internal reference. Whether the word "order"
sufficiently identified the unsigned writing was a question of fact. When it is
resolved against identification, there is no memorandum.
883 191 Wash. 549, 71 P.2d 382 (1937). The result seems obviously sound although
the court's explanation leaves something to be desired. The court quoted from an
earlier Washington decision in which the fact that the discharge transaction was
"executed" was stressed. The problem is more complicated. An accord is not within
any statute of frauds unless it involves a performance such as transfer of an interest
in land or a chattel, which the statute covers. The mere fact the duty sought to be
discharged was created by a written contract within the statute does not extend the
statute to the accord. (Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 522 (1932), discussing rescis-
sion agreements). The typical accord, under which the obligor's performance is pay-
ment, within a year, is not within the statute. The Kelly Springfield Tire Company
case did involve a performance (transfer of tires) which was within the statute. The
tires were at once delivered however and the statute was accordingly satisfied.
84 Conduct as a basis for implication was discussed above, under the subheadings
"Implied Contracts" and "Implication," at n. 3 et seq., and n. 15 et seq.
885 RrSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 226 (1932); 3 WniSTOi , CONACTS §§ 601, 602
(rev. ed. 1936). In a contract transaction the expression of purpose will normally
relate to what a promisor wil do and under what circumstances; disputes about mean-
ing will accordingly be disputes about the scope of a promised performance. Where
the issue is contract formation, e.g., whether a particular communication is an offer,
the inquiry often ranges into other aspects. See the discussion above under the sub-
heading "Offer," at n. 36 et seq. See also n. 389 below.
1959]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
agreement, expressed no purpose with regard to the details now in
dispute, the court will not under guise of interpretation supply those
details."'s Schoenwald v. Diamond K Packing Co."s7 is illustrative.'88
Obviously critical are the legal principles by which the court will
be guided in resolving disputes about meaning. Several of these prin-
ciples can be ascertained and restated with reasonable assurance. The
goal of interpretation is to find the meaning objectively expressed in
language or conduct (not what went on in the mind of the speaker,
writer or actor).9 It is not the court's function to construct or re-
388 3 CoaniN, CONTRACTS § 534 (1950).
387 192 Wash. 409, 73 P.2d 748 (1937). A contract document covering a joint
venture in the operation of fish traps specified in detail the duties of the defendant as
operator of the traps and provided for operation by the plaintiff on a contingency
(which occurred), saying of his operation only that he "shall have then the right to
make arrangements for the construction and maintenance of this trap for the benefit
of both parties . . ." The trial court in a declaratory judgment action entered a
decree requiring the plaintiff to do a number of the things which the defendant under-
took to do while it operated the traps. This, the supreme court held, was error because
the parties expressed no purpose about the details of plaintiff's operation and inter-
pretation must end when the meaning of the quoted passage is ascertained. This
passage expresses only a purpose to have a joint venture with equal sharing of the
burden or benefits. The trial court's additions amount to making a new contract. The
court's analysis and solution seem to be eminently sound.
388 See also Chaffee v. Chaffee, 19 Wn.2d 607, 145 P.2d 244 (1943); Merlin v.
Rodine, 32 Wn2d 757, 203 P.2d 683 (1949) ; Tube-Art Display, Inc. v. Berg, 37 Wn.2d
1, 221 P.2d 510 (1950) ; Silen v. Silen, 44 Wn.2d 884, 271 P.2d 674 (1954) ; Cf. the
discussion below at nm. 416 and 427; if the parties agree on additional terms but fail to
state them in the written agreement, the parol evidence rule (or its exceptions)
governs proof of them.19 Vance v. Ingram, 16 Wn.2d 399, 133 P.2d 938 (1943) (the opinion also suggests
that if the writing is ambiguous, "the actual unexpressed intentions of the parties"
may be considered; similarly in Downie v. Cooledge, 48 Wn2d 485, 294 P.2d 926(1956) evidence offered to show the "intent of the parties in executing" the document
was rejected for the stated reason, "the agreement was not ambiguous on its face";
the propriety of inquiry into unexpressed purpose, even to resolve ambiguity, seems
doubtful) ; Seavey Hop Corp. v. Pollock, 20 Wn.2d 337, 349, 147 P.2d 310 (1944) ("It is
the duty of the court to declare the meaning of what is written, and not what was in-
tended to be written") ; Gaasland Co. v. Hyak Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 42 Wn.2d 705,
257 P.2d 784 (1953) ; Bakke v. Columbia Valley Lumber Co., 49 Wn.2d 165, 298 P.2d
849 (1956). An exception, important but of very limited application, must be made
where mistake is in issue. See Vance v. Ingrain, supra, and the discussion above under
the subheading "Mistake," at n. 91 et seq.; see also RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS §§ 71,
230 comment a, 233 comment b (1932) ; 3 CoREiN, CONTRACTS § 538 (1950) ; Reid Co. v.
M-B Contracting Co., 46 Wn.2d 784, 285 P.2d 121 (1955). There may be still another
exception. The unexpressed purpose (i.e., not to accept) of an offeree for a unilateral
contract, who does the requested act, may be relevant. See RESTATEMENT, CONTrACTs§ 55 (1932); 1 WxmmsToN, CONTaRCTS §§ 66, 67 (rev. ed. 1936). "Intent of the
parties," a phrase which recurs in the opinions, has subjective-purpose connotations
which do not actually appertain outside the mistake area. It is evident too that the
phrase "the parties" has troublesome connotations if taken literally. If both parties
have adopted the questioned language, as will be the case where they adopt a writing
as expressing their purpose, the phrase is not confusing. If the questioned language
is that of one party, not adopted by the other, as may be the case when a letter offer is
accepted, the phrase is misleading. For the latter situation the RESTATEmENT proposes,
as the basic interpretation technic, giving the expression of purpose the meaning
which the one who used it should reasonably have expected the other to give it. RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 233 (1932). For the integration, i.e., language adopted by
both parties, the RESTATEMENT proposes a different technic; the language will be given
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construct a contract, withal the court might accomplish a considerably
better contract than did the parties.890
Where the dispute is about the meaning of a word, the "ordinary
meaning" will govern unless there is a sufficient reason for taking some
other meaning.8 ' The ordinary meaning is often found by consulting
the meaning which a "reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative
usages and knowing all the circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the
making of the integration, other than oral statements by the parties of what they
intended it to mean" would give it. RESTATEMExT, CONTRAcTs § 230 (1932). See also
3 CoRpNn, CoNTRAcrs §§ 537, 538 (1950). The language of the Washington opinions
does not appear to differentiate in this way between integrated and nonintegrated
agreements.990 See for examples the cases cited in nn. 387 and 388 above; Clements v. Olsen,
46 Wn.2d 445, 282 P.2d 266 (1955) ; and Peters v. Watson Co., 40 Wn.2d 121, 241 P.2d
441 (1952). Just how far this proposition extends is not clear; it has let-the-chips-
fall-where-they-may implications which are offset by other ideas, implicit in some of
the specific canons of interpretation indicated below; for example, the preference of
the court for a reasonable and effective result.
391 Handley v. Oakley, 10 Wn2d 396, 116 P.2d 833 (1941) ; Seattle v. Norihern
Pac. Ry., 12 Wn.2d 247, 121 P.2d 382 (1942) ; Bellingham Sec. Syndicate v. Belling-
ham Coal Mines, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942); Cleveland v. Sun Life
Assurance Co., 13 Wn.2d 318, 125 P.2d 251 (1942) (rule apparently followed); Gray
v. Tarbox, 14 Wn.2d 236, 127 P.2d 415 (1942) ; Omicron v. Hansen, 16 Wn.2d 362,
133 P.2d 505 (1943) (rule apparently followed) ; Vernon v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y, 15 Wn.2d 94, 129 P.2d 801 (1942) (rule apparently followed) ; Viking Sprinkler
Co. v. Pacific Indus. Co., 19 Wn.2d 294, 142 P.2d 394 (1943) ; In re Garrity's Estate,
22 Wn2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945) ; Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Wn2d
594, 174 P.2d 961 (1946) (the opinion contains an unusually good statement of the
basic principle) ; Jack v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., 33 Wn2d 265, 205 P.2d 351 (1949)
(indicating that the ordinary meaning will not govern where the over-all purpose of
the contract dictates otherwise) ; Mead v. Anton, 33 Wn.2d 741, 207 P.2d 227 (1949) ;
Minder v. Rowley, 35 Wn.2d 92, 211 P.2d 170 (1949) ; Finch v. King Solomon Lodge
No. 60, 40 Wn.2d 440, 243 P.2d 645 (1952) ; Rew v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co.,
41 Wn.2d 577, 250 P2d 956 (1952) ; Boeing Airplane Co. v. Firemen's Fund Indem.
Co., 44 Wn2d 488, 268 P2d 654 (1954) (rule stated but not applied; the controversy
concerned the meaning of an insurance policy word, "possession"; this the court said
was ambiguous, a conclusion apparently reached upon examining "possession" as a
legal concept rather than examining a standard dictionary. In effect, the court recog-
nized that a word may be used by the parties in other than its ordinary usage) ; this
idea also appeared in Christensen v. Sterling Ins. Co., 46 Wn.2d 713, 284 P.2d 287
(1955) (the word "war" was found to have been used in a non-technical way and to
be operative as intended by the parties). On the other hand, the word "radius"T was in
LeMaine v. Seals, 47 Wn.2d 259, 287 P.2d 305 (1955), given a literal meaning because
a prior case (Mead v. Anton, ,supra) had so held; the rationale is unsupportable. The
meaning of no word is fixed by its interpretation in one decision, or in many; each
decision represents but a finding as to the intent of the parties. There are instances
in which the law fixes the meaning of a word. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 234
(1932) ; this is not such an instance. Pierce County v. King, 47 Wn.2d 328, 287 P.2d
316 (1955) is also of interest at this point. The word "sale," used in a real estate
contract clause dealing with alienation by the vendee, was found not to encompass
condemnation. A prior case reaching a contrary interpretation of a lease provision
was urged on the court, without success. Although the court referred to "the rule"
announced in the prior case (certainly an erroneous evaluation of the effect of inter-
pretation), it was held inapplicable. The reason apparently appears in the passage,
"It may be useful for some purposes to regard a condemnation as a forced sale, but
the two types of transactions certainly are not identical in all respects . . ." Just
where "ordinary meaning" ends and ambiguity begins can be difficult to determine; in
Selective Logging Co. v. General Cas. Co., 49 Wn2d 347, 301 P.2d 535 (1956) the
court was obliged to determine what "handling" meant; the word appeared in the
exclusion clause of a liability policy; it was found on examining WoRDs AND PHRASES
to have various "ordinary" meanings and hence to be in a sense ambiguous; yet the
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a standard unabridged dictionary, sometimes by finding what meaning
other courts have given the word, and sometimes by methods the court
does not disclose. If a word has several "ordinary" meanings, the
combination of which the word is a part will usually indicate the right
choice. If it does not, there is ambiguity which will be resolved by
resort to the techniques used when a combination of words is am-
biguous.392
Several "sufficient reasons for taking some other meaning" are
illustrated in the cases; 93 these probably do not exhaust the possi-
bilities, although the limits of the idea remain obscure. One important
reason is the necessity for making the word jibe with the rest of the
combination of which it is a part.
The over-all meaning must control.83" Multiple documents will
accordingly be interpreted together if they comprise one transaction."'
court found none of the "ordinary" meanings was broad enough to encompass the
plaintiff's asserted meaning and declined, under guise of interpreting in favor of the
insured, to accept a meaning which it felt to be unreasonable under the circumstances.
In Truck Ins. Exch. v. Rohde, 49 Wn2d 465, 303 P.2d 659 (1956), the word "accident"
was interpreted; the court started with the "ordinary," i.e., the dictionary meaning.
892 Selective Logging Co. v. General Cas. Co., 49 Wn.2d 347, 301 P.2d 535 (1936),
seems to be an example; the multiple meanings were ascertained by consulting WoRns
AND PHRAsEs; the court concluded that none of the possible meanings of the key word
was broad enough to encompass plaintiff's claim. As to the technics by which ambiguity
will be resolved, see the discussion at n. 397 et seq. below.
s93 Simons v. Stokely Foods, Inc., 35 Wn.2d 920, 216 P2d 215 (1950) (usage; see
the discussion below under that section heading) ; Jack v. Standard Marine Ins. Co.,
33 Wn.2d 265, 205 P.2d 351 (1949) (over-all purpose dictated a non-ordinary mean-
ing) ; Boeing Airplane Co. v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 44 Wn.2d 488, 268 P.2d 654
(1954) (the "broadest" meaning was given to the word "possession" after examining
the "surrounding circumstances"); Christensen v. Sterling Ins. Co., 46 Wn.2d 713,
284 P2d 287 (1955) (the word "war" was found to have been used in a non-technical
way; over-all purpose was probably the controlling idea). Several of these cases are
discussed in n. 391 above. See also RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 227 (1932), which
indicates some of the possible standards which the parties themselves may contemplate
when they use a word. In connection with terms of art in a trade or profession see
RESTATEMENT, CONRAcTs § 235(b) (1932) and the WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS to
that subsection.
394 Sibbald v. Chehalis Say. & Loan Ass'n, 6 Wn.2d 203, 107 P.2d 333 (1940);
Bellingham Sec. Syndicate v. Bellingham Coal Mines, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 370, 125 P.2d
668 (1942); Tube-Art Display, Inc. v. Berg, 37 Wn2d 1, 221 P.2d 510 (1950);
Johnson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 22 Wn.2d 305, 155 P.2d 806 (1945) ; In re Garrity's
Estate, 22 Wn2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945); Clements v. Olsen, 46 Wn.2d 445, 282
P.2d 266 (1955) ; Truck Ins. Exch. v. Rohde, 49 Wn.2d 465, 303 P.2d 659 (1956).395 Ethredge v. Diamond Drill Contracting Co., 196 Wash. 483, 83 P.2d 364 (1938)
(original contract document and a subsequently executed writing evidencing a modi-
fication agreement) ; Vance v. Ingram, 16 Wn.2d 399, 133 P.2d 938 (1943) ; Brun v.
Northern Life Ins. Co., 16 Wn.2d 564, 134 P.2d 84 (1943) (application and life insur-
ance policy) ; Moore v. Gillingham, 22 Wn.2d 655, 157 P.2d 598 (1945) (sale contract
and deed); Largent v. Ritcher, 38 Wn.2d 856, 233 P.2d 1019 (1951) (commission
agreement read with earnest money agreement); Paine-Gallucci, Inc. v. Anderson,
41 Wn.2d 46, 246 P.2d 1095 (1952) (bid, building contract and specifications inter-
preted together as parts of the same transaction; the analysis seems faulty; the bid
was not a part of the contract and was merged into the contract document; examination
of the bid was justifiable but on another ground; the bid was part of the "surrounding
circumstances." See the discussion below at n. 403 et seq.); Brown v. Poston, 44
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If the court deems the over-all meaning to be unclear, whether be-
cause a key word has multiple meanings or otherwise, there are at
hand several ways to resolve the conflict. The conduct of the parties,
i.e., "practical construction," may provide an answer."' Specific pro-
visions control general ones."' A recital can be considered. 9 A type-
written clause will prevail over an inconsistent printed one. 99 An
interpretation which gives a reasonable and effective operation to all
of the language is to be preferred.0' ° Ambiguity will be resolved
against the person who used the unclear language. 01 Ambiguity will
Wn.2d 717, 269 P.2d 967 (1954) (building contract read with the plans and specifica-
tions). See also RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcTs §§ 230, 235 (d) (1932).996 Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 4 Wn.2d 541, 104 P.2d 310 (1940) ; Belling-
ham Sec. Syndicate v. Bellingham Coal Mines, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 370, 125 P.2d 668
(1942) ; Thayer v. Brady, 28 Wn.2d 767, 184 P.2d 50 (1947) ; Eggers v. Luster, 32
Wn2d 86, 200 P.2d 521 (1948) ; Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. National Bank of Com-
merce, 35 Wn.2d 522, 214 P.2d 183 (1950) ; Blume v. Bohanna, 38 Wn2d 199, 228 P.2d
146 (1951) ; Toulouse v. New York Life Ins. Co., 40 Wn.2d 538, 245 P.2d 205 (1952) ;
Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equip. Co., 45 Wn.2d 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954). Cf.
Clements v. Olsen, 46 Wn.2d 445, 282 P.2d 266 (1955), the cases therein cited, In re
Garrity's Estate, 22 Wn.2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945), and Burch v. Rice, 37 Wn.2d 185,
222 P.2d 847 (1943), which do not so far as the opinions disclose restrict evidence of
practical construction to instances in which the document is ambiguous. The RESTATE-
mNT, CoNTRACTs § 235 (e) (1932) likewise states no such limitation; it does limit
the meaning which can be derived from practical construction to one which a "reason-
able man could attach" to the contract language. See also 3 W.LIsTON, CoNTRACTS§ 623 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CoRniN, CONTRAcTs § 558 (1950).
1,7 Local 104, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 28
Wn.2d 536, 183 P2d 504 (1947).398 Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 4 Wn2d 541, 104 P.2d 310 (1940) ; Brackett
v. Schaefer, 41 Wn.2d 828, 252 P.2d 294 (1953).
899 Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 4 Wn.2d 541, 104 P.2d 310 (1940) (the
court also said that the insuring clause of a group life policy would control if in con-
flict with subsequent clauses) ; Brun v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 16 Wn.2d 564, 134 P.2d
84 (1943); Preugschat v. Hedges, 41 Wnl2d 660, 251 P.2d 166 (1952) (lease; rule
stated but not applied because the two provisions were reconcilible).
,
00 Kandoll v. Penttila, 18 Wn.2d 434, 139 P.2d 616 (1943) ; In re Garrity's Estate,
22 Wn.2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945) ; Griffiths v. Broderick, Inc., 27 Wn.2d 901, 182
P.2d 18 (1947) ; Macri v. Bergevin, 30 Wn.2d 654, 193 P.2d 360 (1948) ; Long-Bell
Lumber Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 35 Wn.2d 522, 214 P.2d 183 (1950)
(reasonableness is to be determined by the circumstances extant when the agreement
was made, not by events which occur thereafter) ; Blume v. Bohanna, 38 Wn.2d 199,
228 P.2d 146 (1951) ; Largent v. Ritchey, 38 Wn.2d 856, 233 P.2d 1019 (1951) ; Phila-
delphia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. City of Grandview, 42 Wn.2d 357, 225 P.2d 540
(1953) ; Newsom v. Miller, 42 Wn.2d 727, 258 P.2d 812 (1953).
40, Dowell, Inc. v. United Pac. Cas. Ins. Co., 191 Wash. 666, 72 P.2d 296 (1937);
Murray v. Odman, 1 Wn2d 481, 96 P.2d 489 (1939); Van Riper v. Constitutional
Gov't League, 1 Wn.2d 635, 96 P.2d 588 (1939) ; Grand Lodge, Scandinavian Frater-
nity, Dist. 7 v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 2 Wn.2d 561, 98 P.2d 971 (1940) ;
Kane v. Order of United Com. Travelers, 3 Wn.2d 355, 100 P.2d 1036 (1940) ; Handley
v. Oakley, 10 Wn.2d 396, 116 P.2d 833 (1941) (application of the rule refused; no
ambiguity found); State Bank of Wilbur v. Phillips, 11 Wn.2d 483, 119 P.2d 664(1941) ; Malott v. General Mach. Co., 19 Wn.2d 62, 141 P.2d 146 (1943) ; Dorsey v.
Strand, 21 Wn.2d 217, 150 P.2d 702 (1944); McCarty v. King County Medical Serv.
Corp., 26 Wn.2d 660, 175 P.2d 653 (1946); Jack v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., 33
Wn.2d 265, 205 P.2d 351 (1949) ; Blume v. Bohanna, 38 Wn.2d 199, 228 P.2d 146
(1951); California E. Airways, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 38 Wn.2d 378, 299 P.2d
540 (1951) (rule not applied; no ambiguity found) ; Rew v. Beneficial Standard Life
Ins. Co., 41 Wn.2d 577, 250 P.2d 956 (1952) (rule not applied; no ambiguity found) ;
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also justify the admission of evidence about the circumstances under
which the agreement was reached;4"2 (whether this evidence should
come in even where the writing is not ambiguous is discussed in the
following paragraphs). One of these propositions may conflict with
another; which the court will use in a given situation will be difficult
to predict. No sequence or hierarchy of importance has been stated.
There remains to be discussed the interpretation issue which pre-
sents the greatest difficulty. If the disputed language is written, will
the proponent of one meaning be permitted to aid his cause by verbal
testimony? If so, what is the permissible range such testimony can
take? On these important details the Washington cases are in con-
fusion.
There are cases in which the court examined the circumstances
surrounding the execution of a writing as an aid to its interpretation
and sustained the admissibility of the pertinent evidence even though
the writing might on its face be unambiguous." 3 The position taken
Newsom v. Miller, 42 Wn.2d 727, 258 P.2d 812 (1953) (rule not applied; no ambiguity
found); Williamson v. Irwin, 44 Wn.2d 373, 267 P.2d 702 (1954) ; Jeffries v. General
Cas. Co., 46 Wn.2d 543, 283 P.2d 128 (1955) (rule not applied; no ambiguity found) ;
Selective Logging Co. v. General Cas. Co., 49 Wn.2d 347, 301 P.2d 535 (1956). In
Murray v. Odman and Blume v. Bohanna, supra, the rule was given an undesirably
specialized phrasing, e.g., interpretation of a lease option in favor of the lessee; this
might prove embarrassing should the court encounter a lease prepared by the lessee.
Similarly, some of the insurance cases cited above phrase the rule, "interpretation in
favor of the insured"; the practice is hardly to be commended even in instances of
insurance contracts, as it obscures the reason for the rule. Attempts to persuade the
court to stretch the meaning of an unambiguous policy have been unsuccessful. See for
example Hamilton Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Automobile Ins. Co., 39 Wn.2d 688, 237
P.2d 781 (1951). Grand Lodge, Scandinavian Fraternity, Dist. 7 v. United States Fid.
& Guar. Co., supra, suggests, but does not answer, a difficult question about the
contracts of compensated sureties: Which is the controlling idea, interpretation of
ambiguity against the surety as the draftsman of the contract, or interpretation for
the surety because it is a surety?
402 For case citations see n. 404 below.
403 Grand Lodge, Scandinavian Fraternity, Dist. 7 v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 2 Wn.2d 561, 98 P.2d 971 (1940) ; Vance v. Ingram, 16 Wn.2d 399, 133 P.2d 938
(1943) ("the court may always consider the surrounding circumstances leading up to
the execution of an agreement, not to evidence an intent contrary to that expressed in
the agreement, but to place the court in the same position as the parties") ; Seavey Hop
Corp. v. Pollock, 20 Wn.2d 337, 147 P.2d 310 (1944) (the opinion contains an excellent
statement refuting the applicability of the parol evidence rule to bar interpretation
evidence) ; In re Garrity's Estate, 22 Wn.2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945) (the court will
consider "all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the subject
matter . . .") ; Moore v. Gillingham, 22 Wn.2d 655, 157 P2d 598 (1945) ("parol
evidence is admissible to show the circumstances under which the instruments were
executed") ; Ridder v. Blethen, 24 Wn.2d 552, 166 P.2d 834 (1946) (parol proof of
"intent" admitted, on issue of donee beneficiary status as discussed note 235 et seq.
above; cf. Cascade Timber Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 Wn.2d 684, 184 P.2d 90
(1947), which appears to require, erroneously, ambiguity as a requisite to admission
of the proof); Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 35 Wn.2d 522,
214 P.2d 183 (1950) (RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 230 (1932) approved; the circum-
stances when the agreement was made were held to be relevant, not subsequent develop-
ments) ; Tube-Art Display, Inc. v. Berg, 37 Wn.2d 1, 221 P.2d 510 (1950) ("In con-
struing this agreement we must consider the situation of the parties at the time of its
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in these cases is the one endorsed by Professors Corbin and Williston
and by the Restatement of Contracts.4 It is the only approach which
can consistently yield interpretations likely to coincide with the mean-
ings the parties contemplated."'
There are other cases in which the court indicated that it will not
look beyond the four corners of a contract writing unless what appears
within those four corners is ambiguous." 6 The reason is variously
execution."); Carroll Constr. Co. v. Smith, 37 Wn.2d 322, 223 P.2d 606 (1950)(quoting from an earlier case: "The first and best resort in the construction of con-
tracts is to put oneself in the place of the parties at the time contract was executed
.. ") ; Clements v. Olsen, 46 Wn.2d 445, 282 P.2d 266 (1955). See also Standring v.
Mooney, 14 Wn.2d 220, 127 P.2d 401 (1942) (deed construction) ; Willett v. Davis,
30 Wn.2d 622, 193 P.2d 321 (1948) ("cost of labor" in a cost-plus contract held to
include the wages of foremen because union rules require foremen and it must have
been anticipated that union labor would be hired; "the law must deal with the practi-
calities and mores of the time and place . . .") ; Skaug v. Gibbs, 39 Wn2d 269, 235
P.2d 154 (1951) (construction of mining lease).
404 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 536 (1950) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 609, 618, 629(rev. ed. 1936) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 230 (1932).
405 "It is true that when a judge reads the words of a contract he may jump to the
instant and confident opinion that they have but one reasonable meaning and that he
knows what it is. A greater familiarity with dictionaries and the usages of words, a
better understanding of the uncertainties of language, and a comparative study of
more cases in the field of interpretation, will make one beware of holding such an
opinion so recklessly arrived at." 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 535, p. 14 (1950). "There-
fore, it is invariably necessary, before a court can give any meaning to the words of a
contract and can select one meaning rather than other possible ones as the basis for
the determination of rights and other legal effects, that extrinsic evidence shall be
heard to make the court aware of the 'surrounding circumstances,' including the per-
sons, objects, and events to which the words can be applied and which caused the
words to be used." Ibid. § 536, p. 19. No contract document springs from a void or
exists in a vacuum. Each writing has a background and a setting. The parties have
diverse levels of education and experience and may occupy a significant relationship
because of past dealings, family relations and the like. There will have been preceding
negotiations of greater or lesser extent. The writing may be the product of skilled
and careful drafting, or the contrary. In form it may be a formal bilateral contract
document or a formal unilateral one or entirely informal variations such as purchase
orders, "home-made" memoranda, letters or telegrams. No contract writing can be
fairly interpreted without knowing about these details, which comprise its origins and
setting.
4
0
6 Ethredge v. Diamond Drill Contracting Co., 196 Wash. 483, 83 P.2d 364 (1938)(evidence admitted because of ambiguity) ; Stipcich v. Marinovich, 13 Wn.2d 155,
124 P.2d 215 (1942) (evidence admitted bicause of ambiguity) ; Bellingham Sec.
Syndicate v. Bellingham Coal Mines, Inc., 13 Wn2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942) ("It is
only in those cases where the writing fails to provide the answer to a question of
meaning that the courts may look elsewhere for aid in construction. Where the terms
are plain and unambiguous, the meaning of the contract is to be deduced from its
language."); Hansen v. Lindell, 14 Wn.2d 643, 129 P.2d 234 (1942) (evidence ad-
mitted because of ambiguity); Hoover v. Sandifur, 25 Wn.2d 791, 171 P.2d 1000(1946) (evidence admitted because of ambiguity) ; Goerig v. Elliott, 27 Wn.2d 600,
179 P.2d 320 (1947) (evidence admitted because of ambiguity) ; Macri v. Bergevin,
30 Wn.2d 654, 193 P.2d 360 (1948) (evidence refused; "In a case where, after all the
rules of construction of a contract have been used, there is still a clear ambiguity,
parol evidence is admissible, not to vary or to modify the written instrument, but to
explain it.") : Reinemann v. Anderson, 34 Wn.2d 809, 210 P.2d 394 (1949) (evidence
admitted because of ambiguity) ; Minder v. Rowley, 35 Wn.2d 92, 211 P.2d 170 (1949)(evidence of "circumstances existing at or about the time of the execution of the
agreement" was refused, although offered to explain the writing) ; Jackson v. Dom-
schot, 40 Wn.2d 30, 239 P.2d 1058 (1952) ("the language of the real-estate contract
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stated as an interpretation principle, or as an application of the parol
evidence rule. Neither reason is persuasive. If there is to be an inter-
pretation rule restricting the inquiry to the writing, it must rest on an
assumption about the clarity of written language which experience
shows to be ill-founded. Adoption of the language by both parties adds
nothing to its reliability; if the language has been integrated in a
writing the agreement is entitled to the protection of the parol evidence
rule, but what is to be protected cannot be known until the writing
has been interpreted4 7 The cart is very much in front of the horse
if the parol evidence rule is employed to exclude evidence proffered in
aid of interpretation. The argument that evidence offered for this
purpose should be rejected because it may "vary" or "contradict" the
"plain meaning" of the writing is without substance; interpretation
may have precisely those effects, and properly so. A writing, read in
light of the circumstances under which it was executed, may well prove
to have a meaning it would not have if read in a vacuum. This does
not mean the surrounding circumstances will usually or even often
require a non-literal interpretation of the writing; they may in fact
bolster such an interpretation. It does mean that as a matter of technic,
the door should not be closed on the occasional litigant as to whom
those circumstances point to a non-literal meaning.
These two groups of cases appear to be irreconcilable. The schism
developed before 1937"' and the fact of its existence has been ignored
in the later cases. That it is not known to the court seems unlikely.
The cases are too numerous. Conflicting decisions are often close
in question is clear and not susceptible of interpretation.") ; Keeter v. John Griffith,
Inc., 40 Wn2d 128, 241 P.2d 213 (1952) (evidence admitted because of ambiguity);
Preugschat v. Hedges, 41 Wn.2d 660, 251 P.2d 166 (1952) (court approved trial
court's refusal to consider "the negotiations and background leading up to the execu-
tion of this lease," there being no ambiguity) ; Boeing Airplane Co. v. Firemen's Fund
Indem. Co., 44 Wn.2d 488, 268 P.2d 654 (1952) ; Washington Fish & Oyster Co. v.
G. P. Halferty & Co., 44 Wn.2d 646, 269 P.2d 806 (1954) ; Silen v. Silen, 44 Wn.2d
884, 271 P.2d 674 (1954) ; Schwieger v. Robbins & Co., 48 Wn2d 22, 290 P.2d 984
(1955) ("Neither will the courts permit oral testimony to establish or create an
ambiguity in a written contract.") ; Henry v. Morrow, 49 Wn2d 270, 300 P.2d 574
(1956) (evidence admitted because of ambiguity).
407 "No parol evidence that is offered can be said to vary or contradict a writing
until by process of interpretation it is determined what the writing means. The 'parol
evidence rule' is not, and does not purport to be, a rule of interpretation or a rule as
to the admission of evidence for the purpose of interpretation." 3 CoaimN, CoNRCTS
§ 579 (1950). "All courts agree that the written memorandum must be interpreted
according to legal rules, and that, when so interpreted meanings may sometimes be
given to it which would not have been apparent without parol evidence." 3 Wm~isToN,
CoNTaRcvs § 632 (rev. ed. 1936). See also RESTATEMENT, CoNTrAcTs §§ 238(a), 242
(1932).4 08 See the cases cited, WAsHINGToN ANNOTATIoNS, RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs §§
230, 238(a) (1932).
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together in time. For example, compare Clements v. Olsen 0 9 and the
passage reading:
In ascertaining the intention of the parties to a written instrument, the
courts must look to the wording of the instrument itself as made by the
parties, view it as a whole, and consider all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction, together with the interpretation of the
instrument by the parties themselves as indicated by their subsequent
acts,
with Boeing Airplane Co. v. Firemen's Fund Indemnity Co.41 and the
passage reading:
Where the terms of a contract taken as a whole are plain and un-
ambiguous, the meaning of the contract is to be deduced from its
language alone, and it is unnecessary for a court to resort to any aids
to construction.... But where the language of a contract is ambiguous
... it is the duty of the court to search out the intent of the parties by
viewing the contract as a whole and considering all of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction, including the subject-matter and the
subsequent acts of the parties.
It would be useful to know why the court permits this conflict to
continue. Examination of the later opinions has suggested no worth-
while clue. It would be useful to know under what circumstances
counsel may expect the court to take one approach or the other. No
reliable basis for prediction has been found. In some of the "four-
comers" cases, the excluded evidence may have gone beyond the fair
limits of "surrounding circumstances," or had little probative value. 11
Both points are most illusive. One may suspect that ambiguity is
sometimes found, where reasonable men might differ about its exist-
ence. 12 This too is an illusive point.
The parol evidence rule. For the most part, the later parol evidence
409 46 Wn.2d 445, 282 P.2d 266 (1955) (although the issue was interpretation of a
deed, the disputed deed clause evidenced part of a life support agreement; for the quoted
language a contract case was cited).
410 44 Wn.2d 488, 268 P.2d 654 (1954) (ambiguity was found and evidence of the
surrounding circumstances was admitted).
411. There must be some limits to "surrounding circumstances" but where the dividing
line falls is unclear. See the discussion at n. 389 above. Although the detail is not one
about which assurance can be reached, it seems that the proponent of proof of sur-
rounding circumstances is on occasion trying to make from them a good deal more
that he could reasonably expect a court to swallow. The unpersuasiveness of the
proffered proof is not however a valid reason for excluding it.
412 Cascade Timber Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 Wn.2d 684, 184 P2d 90 (1947) may
be an example.
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rule cases reiterated long established basic propositions. 13 The rule
is a rule of substantive law and "failure to object to oral testimony
inconsistent with the written agreement does not constitute a waiver
of the right to have inconsistent parol excluded."'" Adoption of a
writing or writings as the final expression of the parties' agreement is
the test by which the transactions to which the rule applies will be
isolated. 5 If part of an agreement is covered by such a writing, there
is a partial integration. 8 The rule does not preclude proof of a "col-
lateral agreement,"'1 or of an agreement which modifies"' or dis-
413 For the earlier cases, see WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 236 et seq. The operation of the rule as a reason for refusing to consider
parol proof is illustrated by the following 1937-1957 cases: Asher Bros. Gen. Illumi-
nating Co. v. General Illuminating Co., 193 Wash. 105, 74 P.2d 495 (1937); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Nicholas, 2 Wn.2d 128, 97 P.2d 633 (1939) ; Dopps v. Alderman,
12 Wn.2d 268, 121 P2d 388 (1942) ; Schnitzer v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 14 Wn.2d
434, 128 P.2d 501 (1942) (bill of sale excepted a particular engine; buyer not per-
mitted to show a prior agreement for inclusion of the engine if the seller did not
dispose of it to another person) ; Vance v. Ingram, 16 Wn.2d 399, 133 P2d 938 (1943)
(writings evidenced a partnership agreement; parol evidence offered to prove an
agreement for a different relationship held to be barred by the rule) ; Mapes v. Santa
Cruz Fruit Packing Corp., 26 Wn.2d 145, 173 P.2d 182 (1946); Macri v. Bergevin,
30 Wn.2d 654, 193 P.2d 360 (1948) ; Hopkins v. Barlin, 31 Wn2d 260, 196 P.2d 347(1948) ; Merlin v. Rodine, 32 Wn.2d 757, 203 P.2d 683 (1949) ; Truck-Trailer Equip.
Co. v. S. Birch & Sons Constr. Co., 38 Wn.2d 583, 231 P.2d 304 (1951) ("rule applies to
documentary, as well as oral, evidence") ; Reeder v. Western Gas & Power Co., 42
Wn.2d 542, 256 P.2d 825 (1953) ; Washington Fish & Oyster Co. v. G. P. Halferty &
Co., 44 Wn2d 646, 269 P.2d 806 (1954) ; Simms v. Ervin, 46 Wn2d 417, 282 P.2d 291(1955) (purchase order superseded by a conditional sale contract; rule applied al-
though not mentioned; the application seems erroneous; see n. 447 below). Cf. Wit-
tenberg v. Sylvia, 35 Wn.2d 626, 214 P.2d 690 (1950) (rule held inapplicable in a
contest between a party to the writing and one who was neither party nor successor to
a party; for a criticism of this proposition see 3 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 596 (1950)) ;
Cf. also St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Fox, 26 Wn.2d 109, 173 P.2d 194 (1946),
which seems clearly wrong in applying the rule; the critical issue was interpretation of
a letter-offer, which was certainly no integration.
414 Reeder v. Western Gas etc. Co., 42 Wn2d 542, 256 P.2d 825 (1953).
415 Schnitzer v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 14 Wn.2d 434, 128 P.2d 501 (1942) (RE-
STATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 228, 229 (1932) term "integration" used and approved);
Vance v. Ingram, 16 Wn.2d 399, 133 P.2d 938 (1943) ; Logsdon v. Trunk, 37 Wn.2d
175, 222 P.2d 851 (1950); Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wn.2d 41, 216 P.2d 196 (1950)
(discussed at nn. 429 and 430 below). See also Washington Fish & Oyster Co. v.
G. P. Halferty & Co., 44 Wn.2d 646, 269 P.2d 806 (1954) (discussed at n. 431 below);
Simms v. Erwin, 46 Wn.2d 417, 282 P.2d 291 (1955) ; and n. 404 above.416 Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wn.2d 334, 205 P.2d 628 (1949) (the court said it was
committed to the view that an integration will be deemed total if the writing purports
to cover the entire subject matter of the transaction, but "where it appears that only a
part of the contract is in writing, the part not in writing may be proved by parol, in so
far as it is not inconsistent with the written portion") ; von Herberg v. von Herberg,
6 Wn2d 100, 106 P.2d 737 (1940) (partial integration found) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Nicholas, 2 Wn.2d 128, 97 P.2d 633 (1939) (good discussion; integration found to
be total).
417 Moe v. American Ice & Cold Storage Co., 30 Wn.2d 51, 190 P.2d 755 (1948)
(rule apparently applied) ; Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wn.2d 334, 205 P.2d 628 (1949) ;
Keeter v. John Griffith, Inc., 40 Wn.2d 128, 241 P.2d 213 (1952); Vikingstad v.
Baggott, 46 Wn.2d 494, 282 P.2d 824 (1955). Cf., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nicholas,
2 Wn.2d 128, 97 P.2d 633 (1939) (rule not applied; asserted oral agreement was not
"collateral"). In Morango v. Phillips, 33 Wn.2d 351, 205 P.2d 892 (1949) and Peter-
son v. Schoonover, 42 Wn.2d 621, 257 P.2d 209 (1953), the court found two contracts,
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charges 19 an integrated agreement, or of fraud, 2" failure of consid-
eration, 2' mistake422 or illegality. 2s There is an important inter-
relation between the rule and interpretation, which was discussed in
the preceding section.
A receipt is not a contract and not an integration. Recitals in such
a document are not protected by the parol evidence rule.'2 Neither
are recitals of fact in an integrationY.2 5 Although the court has talked
as though a like liberality extends to any proof aimed to establish the
true consideration for an agreement, 2 ' such statements are not to be
taken literally. Where a bilateral agreement states a promise, it cannot
be shown that the promise was not in fact made 27 Nor can an addi-
tional promise be fastened on the promisor by parol, where the instru-
one written and one oral; proof of the oral contract was held to be unaffected by the
parol evidence rule.
418 Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wn2d 334, 205 P.2d 628 (1949).
419 Morango v. Phillips, 33 Wn.2d 351, 205 P.2d 892 (1949) (mutual rescission).
420 Goerig v. Elliott, 27 Wn.2d 600, 179 P.2d 320 (1947) ; Gronlund v. Anderson,
38 Wn2d 60, 227 P.2d 741 (1951) (dictum, recital in the document, "that there have
been no representations, or that all oral representations shall be inoperative," would
not bar proof of fraud); Mele v. Cerenzie, 40 Wn.2d 123, 241 P.2d 669 (1952);
Nyquist v. Foster, 44 Wn2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954).
42 1 Eder v. Nelson, 41 Wn.2d 58, 247 P.2d 230 (1952) ("Absence or failure of con-
sideration, in an action between the original parties to a negotiable instrument, may be
shown by parol evidence"); Cf. Ryan v. Ryan, 48 Wn.2d 593, 295 P.2d 1111 (1956)
(document recited: "That Joseph H. Ryan shall receive as his share Seventy Thousand($70,000.00) Dollars in cash upon the execution of this Agreement . . ." Held, the
parol evidence rule did not bar proof that he had already received $20,000 of the
$70,000). See also nn. 425, 426 and 427 below.
422 Meyer v. Young, 23 Wn.2d 109, 159 P2d 908 (1945) ; Forsburgh v. Sando, 24
Wn.2d 586, 166 P.2d 850 (1946) (rule stated; not applied because the agreement fell
within the Statute of Frauds) ; Goerig v. Elliott, 27 Wn2d 600, 179 P.2d 320 (1947) ;
Akers v. Sinclair, 37 Wn.2d 693, 226 P.2d 225 (1950) ; Bergstrom v. Olson, 39 Wn.2d
536, 236 P.2d 1052 (1951).
'
23 Auve v. Fagnant, 16 Wn.2d 669, 134 P.2d 454 (1943) (usury).
424 Johnson v. Peterson, 43 Wn.2d 820, 264 P.2d 237 (1953) ; see also Hopkins v.
Barlin, 31 Wn2d 260, 196 P.2d 347 (1948) (rule stated but not applied; the document
was found to be an "agreement!').
425 Cowles Publishing Co. v. McMann, 25 Wn.2d 736, 172 P.2d 235 (1946) ("Parol
evidence is admissible to contradict the date of a written instrument") ; Zackovich v.
Jasmont, 32 Wn2d 73, 200 P.2d 742 (1948) (agreement acknowledged receipt of a
cash payment; evidence admitted to show the payment was really made by the execu-
tion of notes) ; Schrock v. Gillingham, 36 Wn.2d 419, 219 P.2d 92 (1950) (a recital
of payment received can be contradicted by parol); Cook v. Vennigerholz, 44 Wn.2d
612, 269 P.2d 824 (1954) (recital of partnership ownership of certain property does
not preclude proof that one partner had a lien on the property). See also Harris v.
Morgensen, 31 Wn.2d 228, 196 P.2d 317 (1948) (receipt rule applied to writing which
read, "Bal. due... $500").
426 Zackovich v. Jasmont, 32 Wn.2d 73, 200 P.2d 742 (1948) ("It has become an
established principle in this state, as elsewhere generally, that parol evidence is ad-
missible to show the true consideration of a written agreement"). See also von Her-
berg v. von Herberg, 6 Wn.2d 100, 106 P.2d 737 (1940).
427 Ryan v. Ryan, 48 Wn.2d 593, 295 P.2d 1111 (1956) (rule stated).
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ment is complete on its face 28 On the other hand, if a purchase agree-
ment does not state the price, the agreed price can be proven. 2
Three integration cases of special interest were decided. Bond v.
Wiegardt'2 involved a contract document which was signed by the
defendant and returned to the plaintiff with a letter insisting on a pay
basis different from the one stated in the document. In an excellent
opinion the court approved admission of the letter, because integration
is an issue which must be resolved before the applicability of the parol
evidence rule can be determined. On this issue the parties' purpose
controls, and hence the letter was relevant evidence of their purpose.
The court went on to find the integration to consist of the document
plus the letter. 31
Washington Fish & Oyster Co. v. G. P. Halferty & Co.,"3 2 involved
a memorandum confirming a verbal sales agrement, and demonstrates
that neither formality nor execution by both parties are requisites for
an integration.
One of the more difficult integration problems reached the court in
Randall v. Tradewell Stores, Inc.33 Where a contract document does
not specify the duration of the transaction, can a contemporaneous
verbal agreement fixing the duration be proved? The court sitting en
banc held "yes." Three judges dissented. Two judges concurred in
the result because they deemed the questioned evidence properly to
have been considered in determining what period would be a "reason-
428 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nichols, 2 Wn.2d 128, 97 P.2d 633 (1939) (buyer in
purchase agreement promised to assume certain specified debts of the seller; parol
proof of a promise to assume another debt held inadmissible) ; von Herberg v. von
Herberg, 6 Wn.2d 100, 106 P2d 737 (1940) (document incomplete; additional promise
can be shown); cf. Vikingstad v. Baggott, 46 Wn.2d 494, 282 P.2d 824 (1955), in
which the evidence was admitted as proof of a "collateral" agreement; cf. also Randall
v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 21 Wn2d 742, 153 P2d 286 (1944), noted 20 WAsH. L. REV.
171 (1945) (agreement silent on the duration of one party's performance; parol evi-
dence of the agreed duration admitted; the case is also discussed at n. 432 below).
429 Keeter v. John Griffith, Inc., 40 Wn2d 128, 241 P.2d 213 (1952); see also
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 240(2) (1932) and the discussion at nn. 432-434 below.
The Keeter case apparently turned an analysis of the omitted price terms as a "col-
lateral agreement"
48o 36 Wn.2d 41, 216 P2d 196 (1950).
431 The contract document was not returned to the plaintiff as a contract and the
letter would come in under another parol evidence rule principle (which the court also
stated, 36 Wn.2d 41, 48, 216 P.2d 196 (1950)) permitting attack on the existence of a
contract ostensibly set forth in the document See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 577 (1950).
432 44 Wn.2d 646, 269 P.2d 806 (1954). Informality can reach a point beyond which
a holding that a document is an integration becomes increasingly unlikely. See 3
CORBIN, CoNRACTs § 588 (1950). Incompleteness or the contrary is also cogent evi-
dence. Logsdon v. Trunk, 37 Wn.2d 175, 222 P2d 851 (1950) (obvious incompleteness
strongly suggests a document is not an integration) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTAcTs § 633(rev. ed. 1950) (document apparently complete will ordinarily be deemed an integra-
tion). Notice also 3 CoaniN, CoNTaAcrs §§ 582, 583 (1950) and the suggestion that
greater liberality in exploring the intent to integrate would be desirable.
43821 Wn.2d 742, 153 P.2d 286 (1944), noted 20 WAsH. L. REV. 171 (1945).
[VOL . 34
CONTRACTS IN W,4SHINGTON
able time." Whether an integration encompasses terms the court
would supply by implication, such as "reasonable time," is a question
other courts have answered variously.' 3 Professor Corbin has ap-
proved the decisions which reach the result achieved in the Randall
case, arguing that an integration is partial only, if it omits an agreed-on
duration term 35
An analogous problem exists where one of two persons who signed a
contract document ostensibly as buyers or borrowers seeks to show
by parol that he really participated in the transaction as surety for
the other. Since suretyship is a legal relation between a principal and
a surety and the writing does not purport to integrate any agreement
inter sese the "buyers" or "borrowers" the parol evidence rule is
arguably inapplicable despite the inference of a co-obligor relationship
derivable from the writing. The Washington court has admitted the
proof, where the issue arose between the principal and the surety.3 '
Presumably the same ruling is expectable in an action by the surety
against the obligor for subrogation. 37 But if the surety attempts to
establish suretyship as a basis for cutting down his obligation to the
obligee, the problem becomes much less easy to resolve. The integra-
tion supports a negative inference, i.e., absence of suretyship. The
presence of this relationship (if proved) brings into play collateral
legal principles which diminish the obligation apparently evidenced
by the writing, e.g., the community property principle restricting a
husband's power to create community suretyship contracts and the
434 3 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 593 (1950); 3 WLSTON, CONTRAcTS § 640 (rev. ed.
1936).
485 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 593, p. 336 (1950). A similar problem exists where the
writing omits an agreed-on price term, if the court would supply "reasonable price' by
implication. Proof of the agreed-on term has been approved by the court (see n. 428
above) but without discussion of the complications introduced by the implication
possibility.
438 Eder v. Nelson, 41 Wn2d 58, 247 P.2d 230 (1952), 43 Wn.2d 536, 262 P.2d 180
(1953), and the cases therein cited. This is the usual result. 3 CoRIN, CONTRACTS
§ 593, p. 341 (1950).
437 Subrogation cannot be had until the creditor's claim against the principal is
fully satisfied; the creditor cannot be harmed by the proof; the principal is indirectly
the real contestant, as the objective of subrogation is to acquire the creditor's right for
use against the principal. There is no more reason for excluding oral proof of surety-
ship, in this situation, than there is where the surety sues the principal for reimburse-
ment. There are a few Washington cases involving comparable problems, in which the
evidence was admitted, apparently without question. Pease v. Syler, 78 Wash. 24, 138
P2d 310 (1914) (surety paid creditor on a note and received an assignment of the
note; he was permitted to sue the principal on the note; unless subrogation was a
remedy available to the surety his payment would have discharged the note) ; Northern
Bank & Trust Co. v. Slater, Watt and Co., 123 Wash. 528, 212 Pac. 1063 (1923)(which has some discussion relevant to subrogation, although the issue was discharge
of the surety).
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principles which create suretyship defenses. "88 On this phase of the
matter the earlier Washington cases left the position of the court
uncertain." 9 The issue came to the court again in Zarbell v. Mantas.'"
The uncertainty continues. The court apparently approved admission
of the evidence if the surety is prepared to show that the obligor knew
of the suretyship relation when the contract was made,"1 but went on
to find ambiguity in the contract document as to status of the signers
and to state this too as a basis for proof of suretyship. The opinion
also acknowledges the possibility that the parol evidence rule might
apply if the integration includes language which evidence of suretyship
would directly contradict."'
Another aspect of the parol evidence rule as to which the Washing-
ton cases are not entirely harmonious is the application of the rule to
proof of a verbal condition.
Preliminarily it should be recalled that there are different types of
condition. There are external conditions precedent, which must be
met before the legal relations known as contract exist." 8 There are
4 3E.g., extension of time, release of collateral or modification of the principal-
creditor contract.
439 Karatofski v. Hampton, 135 Wash. 139, 237 Pac. 17 (1925) (proof of suretyship
proffered by the Hamptons was excluded because the document recited that the
"parties of the second part," who were by the terms of the document buyers of timber,
were "Orting Lumber Company... and S. Wade Hampton and Hildegard Hampton,
his wife"; the court said the proof would directly contradict the quoted language and
hence fell within the parol evidence rule; the decision is disturbing, since any real
difference between the facts of the case and a transaction in which principal and surety
promise "to buy" or "to pay" is very hard to see; moreover, recitals of fact are not
ordinarily protected by the parol evidence rule) ; Bradley Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. Hey-
burn, 56 Wash. 629, 106 Pac. 170 (1910) (maker of negotiable note held unable to
prove that he signed for accommodation; the court found its reason in construction of
THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW; earlier cases were discussed in the opinion).
In other cases proof of accommodation status was admitted without question. Northern
Bank and Trust Co. v. Slater, Watt and Co., cited in n. 436 above, is an example.
440 32 Wn.2d 920, 204 P.2d 203 (1949).
441 Knowledge of the suretyship relation has no discernible technical effect on the
parol evidence rule problem but it certainly gives the obligee's attempt to defeat the
proof a different ethical complexion. Of course, if the alleged surety is embarked on a
course of fraud he can fabricate proof of the obligee's knowledge as readily as any
other. Where a suretyship defense is asserted, it can be argued that the requirement of
knowledge when the contract was made is an unnecessary and undesirable limitation
because the defense will not in any instance be available to a surety unless the obligee
knows of his status when the conduct creating the defense occurs. Perhaps the real
reason for permitting proof of suretyship is simply the public interest in preserving
the community property or suretyship-defense proposition which underlies the dispute;
this interest may well over-ride the interest represented by the parol evidence rule.
442 The court said: "Nevertheless, particularly in view of our own case of Karatof-
ski v. Hampton,... we are not prepared to state that there could not be a contract so
explicit in its definition of the character of the parties signing it that parol evidence
would be inadmissible to qualify it." Zarbell v. Mantas, 32 Wn.2d 920, 923, 204 P.2d
203 (1949). The Karatofski case was cited in n. 438 above.
443 For example, if X signs as maker and hands to the payee what is otherwise a
negotiable note for $1,000 and says: "This note shall have legal effect only if W
buys and pays for my house."
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internal conditions precedent, which must be satisfied or excused be-
fore a contract duty is immediately performable. 44 There are condi-
tions subsequent, which operate to extinguish a contract duty which
has matured and been defaulted.' Verbal proof of any type of con-
dition necessarily varies an unconditional written promise. The dif-
ferent kinds of condition simply vary the operation of the promise in
different ways.
Whether a condition precedent is external or internal can be a dose
fact question, the answer to which must be found in interpretation.
The analytic key to this issue is clear enough. If contract relations
were intended to be postponed until the condition event occurred, the
condition is external; otherwise it is internal. The words used in
stating the condition are only evidentiary and must be examined in
their context. The event which is the subject matter of the condition
will often be of concern to but one party; this circumstance is not
relevant, even where the agreement is bilateral, in determining whether
the condition is external or internal.
The parol evidence rule is generally held to be applicable to proof
of an internal condition precedent or a condition subsequent, but in-
applicable to proof of an external condition because the rule protects
only a writing which evidences a contract."" There is no contract until
all external conditions are satisfied."7 A number of Washington cases
reach these results."' In some of them an internal condition (as de-
4,' For example, if X signs as maker and hands to the payee what is otherwise a
negotiable note for $1,000 and says: "I deliver this note to you as a present contract
but if when it matures the price of turkey red seed wheat is less than $2.00 per bushel
I will pay you only $500."
"5 For example, if when the note mentioned above was delivered X said: "You
must sue me within six months after this note matures, should I fail to pay; if you
do not, my legal duty to you will cease," a condition subsequent would have been
stated.
,4, RESTATEMENT, CONTACTs § 241 (1932) ; 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 577, 589, 592
(1950) ; 3 WI.LISTON, CONTRAcTS § 634 (rev. ed. 1936) ; THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW § 16, (R.C.W. 62.01.016), provides for oral proof of conditional delivery
of a negotiable instrument, save as against a holder in due course.
4,7 On similar reasoning, proof of non-delivery or non-execution of the writing is
not barred by the parol evidence rule. 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 577 (1950) ; 3 WILLI-
SION, CONTBACTS § 634 (rev. ed. 1936).
448 For the earlier cases, see WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTs § 241. The later cases of significance are Walker v. Copeland, 193 Wash. 1,
74 P.2d 469 (1937) (proof permitted, conditional delivery of a negotiable instrument;
THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw was not cited); Mapes v. Santa Cruz Fruit
Corp., 26 Wn.2d 145, 173 P.2d 183 (1946), noted 22 WASH. L.REv. 60 (1947) ; Fleming
v. August, 48 Wn.2d 131, 291 P.2d 939 (1955) ; Ravenholt v. Hallowell, 48 Wn.2d 136,
291 P.2d 653 (1953) ; Mell v. Winslow, 49 Wn.2d 738, 306 P.2d 751 (1957) (condi-
tional delivery of a negotiable instrument; THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw was
not cited); See also Nelson Equip. Co. v. Goodman, discussed in n. 449 below. The
Fleming and Ravenholt cases are discussed in Note, 31 WASH. L.REv. 105 (1955).
In the Mapes, Fleming and Ravenholt cases the court addressed itself to the question,
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fined above) was called a condition subsequent, but this has of course
no effect on application of the parol evidence rule as the rule applies
to both types of condition."' A good deal more disturbing is language
in a few cases which apparently repudiates the traditional external v.
internal condition test. These cases appear to adopt a test under
which proof of an oral condition is admitted if it does not contradict
or vary the writing, and rejected if it does. They seem wrong in prin-
ciple. Certainly they have introduced an unfortunate complication
which can be resolved only by future litigation.5
Did the parties intend a contract at the outset? In the Mapes and Ravenholt cases it
was found as a fact that they did; the evidence of a qualifying condition was accord-
ingly rejected. A contrary finding was made in the Fleming case. By way of a test,
the court said in the Mapes case, "In other words, it may be shown by parol that a
written instrument would not be in effect as an obligation of the parties unless
certain other events had transpired." In the Fleming case it was said: "Such evidence
.. merely shows what must occur before the agreement is to take effect," and "the
parties understood and agreed that the obligation to pay under the note was not to
become binding until the entire down payment was made."
49 E.g., the Mapes, Fleming and Ravenholt cases, cited in the preceding note. Cf.,
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 250, 259 (1932); 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 627, 628
(1950) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 666A, 667, 667A (rev. ed. 1936).450 Thus in the Mapes case (cited n. 448 above) the court said: "In the final analysis,
the question always resolves itself down to this: Does the parol testimony actually
vary or change the terms of a written contract? If it does, it is not admissible." This
statement was not necessary to the result as the court found the condition to be an
internal one because the contract was intended to come into existence without regard
to the condition event. In part the idea back of the quoted passage was derived from
the RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 241 (1932), which qualifies the principle under which
an external condition can be proved by adding "If there is nothing in the writing
inconsistent therewith." The qualification may be sound if the contract states one
condition and the disputed one would contradict it, but seems otherwise of doubtful
validity. Professor Corbin has suggested it is unsound: "But if no contract exists 'until
the happening of a future event' it should make no difference that the 'writing' con-
tains words 'inconsistent therewith." 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 589, p. 326, n. 72 (1950).
Both the Mapes case language about contradiction in fact and the RESTATEMENT, CoN-
TRACTS § 241 (1932) were stressed in Nelson Equip. Co. v. Goodman, 42 Wn2d 284,
254 P.2d 727 (1953) (defendant signed a conditional sale contract providing for pay-
ments in April and May and a note payable June 6, and sought to prove an agreement
giving him until June 15th to try out the property; the main vice in his proof may well
have been its implausibility; no court is obliged to believe a promisor who testifies to
an external condition; the stated reason for excluding his evidence was the parol
evidence rule). The Nelson Equip. Co. case was followed in Meyer v. Armstrong,
49 Wn.2d 598, 304 P.2d 710 (1956) noted 31 WAsH. L. Rv. 106 (1957). Testimony
of an oral agreement between maker and payee "that no demand would be made nor
would the note be payable unless and until the mine was either sold or produced an
income from which it could be paid" was held to be inadmissible because the evidence
would contradict the note. Despite the court's statment in the Fleming case (cited
n. 447 above), that proof of conditional delivery "does not vary or contradict the
terms of the written instrument," it should be evident that the contrary is the fact.
The writing on its face evidences a contract promise; it is no less a contradiction for
the promisor to show there is no contract than it is to show a conditional contract
promise. In the Meyer case, the idea which started with the Mapes case came to
fruition in a statement by the court: "If the condition is intended by the parties to
contradict the terms of the instrument, it is not, in fact, a conditional delivery, but a
preagreed modification of a subsequently executed instrument and, as such, falls under
the ban of the parol evidence rule." Contradiction as a test imperils every external
condition and the Meyer case in its result demonstrates the reality of the peril. The
"intent to have a present contract ' test supported by the Mapes, Fleming and Raven-
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Usage. There is an obvious inter-relation between interpretation
and the parol evidence rule, and trade usage. An operative usage is
part of the context in which an agreement is made and hence should
always be demonstrable as an aid to interpretation. 5' If from usage
an additional term can be derived, it should be provable and made a
part of the agreement as would a "collateral agreement," provided the
agreement does not contain terms directly inconsistent with the addi-
tion.
45 2
The later cases suggest that these propositions are acceptable to
the Washington court. In Lyle v. Heidner & Co.,, evidence of usage
in the lumber business was admitted as an aid to interpretation of the
phrase "late November/early December," used by the parties to
designate delivery time. Said the court:
In various phases of commercial, business and professional activities,
certain terms are used which have meanings peculiar to the persons
engaged in that particular type of enterprise. Here, the evidence was
admitted, not for the purpose of varying the terms of a written instru-
ment, but to explain its meaning as understood by those engaged in the
trade in which the term was used; for without such explanation, the
term is indefinite and ambiguous.
A critical detail is whether the court meant to restrict its statement of
the principle to instances of ambiguity. The Restatement of Contracts,
section 246, and Williston on Contracts, section 650 (revised edition),
were cited; both indicate that ambiguity is not a requisite for the ad-
mission of such proof.'"' Intent by the court to adopt the restricted
holt cases (discussed in n. 447 above) seems irreconcilible with the "contradiction"
test used in the Nelson Equipment Co. and Meyer cases and to represent the sounder
approach to the problem. It will be noticed that the Meyer case does not hold an
external condition to be within the parol evidence rule because the proof would con-
tradict a condition stated in the writing; it held the condition not to be external
because of the contradiction the court found to exist. It will be also noticed that the
Nelson Equip. Co. case involved a document reciting "this is the entire agreement."
Some weight was given this recital by the court. Clauses of which type should not
bar proof of an external condition. See 3 CoRBx, CONTRACTS § 578, p. 244, n. 41(1950).
451REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 246(a) (1932); 3 WLLYsToN, CONTRACTS § 650
(rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CORBIN, CoNTRACTs § 555 (1950).
452RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 246(b) (1932); 3 WLLIsToN, CONrRACTS § 652
(rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CORrax, CONTRACTS § 556 (1950).
45345 Wn2d 806, 278 P.2d 650 (1954).
4"T rule stated.., is not confined to unfamiliar words or to words often used
ambiguously .... A usage may show that the meaning of a written contract is different
from an apparently clear meaning which the writing would otherwise bear." RESTATE-
mENT, CONTRACTS § 246, comment on clause (a) (1932). "So it is often said also that
usage is admissible to explain what is doubtful but never to contradict what is plain. If
this statement means that usage is not admitted to contradict a meaning apparently
plain if proof of the usage were excluded.., it is inconsistent with many decisions
and wrong on principle." 3 Wn.usToN, CONTRACTS § 650, p. 1875 (rev. ed. 1936). See
also 3 Co.BiN. CONTRACTS § 555. p. 127-8 (1950).
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proposition seems unlikely (although similar statements appear in
other cases). 5' Usage typically indicates meanings which depart from
ordinary meanings, the latter being clear enough if alone examined;
limitation to the resolution of ambiguity would in large measure de-
vitalize the trade usage principle.""
In Simons v. Stokely Foods, Inc., 5 the seller under a contract for
the sale of peas was permitted to show by parol a usage which obligated
the buyer to furnish harvesting machinery. The document contained
no such provision, and required the seller to "plant, cultivate, harvest
and deliver" the peas. The court, after thorough discussion of the
problem, approved admission of the evidence even though it added a
promise to the buyer's undertaking as expressed in the document.
The phrase, "when there is no contract, proof of usage will not
make one," appeared in two of the later opinions. In Pearce v. Dulien
Steel Prods., Inc., "' the issue was interpretation of an offer; in Milone
& Tucci, Inc., v. Bona Fide Builders,'59 it was the existence of an
offer. In both cases, evidence of trade usage was rejected. The wisdom
of rejecting it must be questioned."8 Perhaps usage should not make a
455 See the cases cited in WASEINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS§ 246, and Preugschat v. Hedges, 41 Wn.2d 660, 251 P2d 166 (1952).
456 Additional support for the suggested interpretation of the Lyle case is provided
by the court's discussion in Simons v. Stokely Foods, Inc. (cited in the following
note) ; see also Willett v. Davis, 30 Wn2d 622, 193 P.2d 321 (1948) (union rules
considered in interpreting the phrase "cost of labor" in a cost-plus construction con-
tract).
457 35 Wn2d 920, 216 P.2d 215 (1950).
45814 Wn.2d 132, 127 P.2d 271 (1942) (offeree received an offer silent about in-
spection; in replying he added to what was otherwise an acceptance, "Hunt will inspect
this rail . . !' The court found variance between offer and reply, and hence no accept-
ance; evidence of a trade usage giving a buyer of steel "the right to inspect or designate
an inspector . . " was held inadmissible).
45949 Wn2d 363, 301 P.2d 759 (1956) (Here a subcontractor submitted a bid
which the main contractor used in computing his own bid, erroneously thinking it was
the lowest subcontractor bid; the main contractor received the job and awarded the
subcontract to another bidder. The trial court found a trade usage to exist on the basis
of which it held there "was ceated... an implied contract to enter into a subcontract
with such bidder. . . ." The supreme court reversed, using the quoted phrase. The
real problem was interpretation of the subcontractor's conduct in submitting a bid.
His conduct could be both an offer to do the work and the proffer of a service. Had
he said in so many words, "I proffer you my bid, prepared at considerable expense to
me and a service to you as without it and like bids you would have to compute these
costs yourself; you may use it only if you award me the subcontract provided you are
awarded the main contract," there is little doubt but what use of the bid would be
acceptance of an offer if the stated condition be met (see the discussion above beginning
at n. 15). If usage attributes this meaning to the subcontractor's conduct it is just as
much in existence as though explicitly stated. Maybe the plaintiff's position was
adversely affected by the fact he was not the lowest bidder. It may be doubted that
the usage found by the trial court actually exists.
460 See the discussion above at nn. 22, 24, 80, 81 and 82; Washington Shoe Mfg. Co.
v. Duke, 126 Wash. 510, 516, 218 Pac. 232 (1923) ; and 3 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 555,
p. 127 (1950) : "Not infrequently cases are found in which rules are laid down, as if
well established, that evidence of usage.., is not admissible ... to make a contract
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promise enforceable where there is not conformity to the usual mutual
assent, consideration, Statute of Frauds, capacity and legality require-
ments."' But, is there any more reason for excluding proof of usage
offered to establish the meaning of an expression of purpose which is
or may be an offer than there is for excluding it when the meaning of
a contract document is in issue? Usage so employed does not "make"
a contract; it merely delineates the expression of purpose to which
the contract-formation principles will be applied.
The court also had occasion to consider the proof requisite to estab-
lish an operative usage. In Simons v. Stokely Foods, Inc., 2 the court
rightly rejected the argument that usage must be "unvarying and
universal."'63 Local usage, established by the defendant's trade prac-
tices over a period of several years, was held to be operative where
the plaintiff knew of and (apparently) relied on it. As Professor
Williston has explained, "The real question where usage is concerned
is whether the parties contracted with reference thereto.., the gen-
erality of habit or usage is important only with reference to the
inference properly to be drawn of the parties' knowledge or ignorance
of its existence."' 6' Seattle Flower & Bulb. Co. v. Burgan'e conformed
to this analysis; evidence of his own trade practices, offered by a
seller, was rejected because there was "no showing that this custom
was so universally observed that (the buyer) should be presumed to
have it in mind and consequently to have contracted in reference to it."
(This article will be continued in subsequent issues.)
where the parties have made none. Such statements are very misleading in form and
are very likely to lead to unjust decisions." See also 3 WILusTo, CONTRACTS § 651,
p. 1880 (rev. ed. 1936) : "Indeed, the very existence or non-existence of a contract may
depend upon usage."
46 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 249 (1932) ; 3 Wu.isTomx, CONTRACTS § 651, p. 1880(rev. ed. 1936).
46235 Wni2d 920, 216 P.2d 215 (1950).
483The idea asserted by the defendant in the Simons case may have been derived
from Washington Brick, Lime & Sewer Pipe Co. v. Anderson, 176 Wash. 416, 29 P.2d
690 (1934) (buyer of brick alleged a trade usage under which a manufacturer-seller
supplies a plan for its installation; he was not successful; the court said: "[T]o establish
a usage.., it must be shown to be uniformly prevalent and universally observed, so
that it may be said that the contracting parties either had such custom in mind or
else must be presumed to have had it in mind, and consequently to have contracted with
reference to it" It seems obvious that the phrase "universally observed" cannot be
disassociated from the rest of the sentence).
4843 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 660 (rev. ed. 1936). In the same section it was said:
"A habit of business confined to the two parties to a contract may by implication be
adopted as an unexpressed part of it. The habit, indeed, of one party, known and
apparently acquiesced in by the other, may prove the adoption of an implied term of
the contract between them." See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 247, 248 (1932).
465 44 Wn.2d 872, 271 P.2d 704 (1954).
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